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CLOSING THE GENDER PAY GAP IN THE EUROPEAN 





The decision by the people of the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) to leave 
the European Union (“Brexit”) has created a renewed interest by global 
employers in the twenty-eight-member common market.  The European 
Union has been constitutionally committed to the concept of equal pay 
based on gender since its inception in 1957, where the guarantee was first 
enshrined in the Treaty of Rome (1957).  However, Article 157 (ex 141, 
119) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) is 
brief on the specifics as to what constitutes pay for the purposes of equal 
treatment.  The European Court of Justice and other national courts have 
been called upon to address various issues including retirement 
contributions, part-time workers, life partnerships, gender reassignment, 
retirement ages, in-kind benefits, sick leave benefits, maternity leave, 
military leave, indirect discrimination, longevity pay, professional 
qualifications, and general criteria for compensation.  Despite the European 
Court of Justice’s broad definition of what constitutes pay for the purposes 
of gender equality, employers and member-state governments do enjoy 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
First, this Article provides the international business and human 
resources practitioner with a broad knowledge as to how the equal pay 
doctrine is applied in Europe.  Second, this Article analyzes the dominant 
themes found in a survey of the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence, 
while also identifying the threats facing the equal pay doctrine in the 
European Union.  Lastly, this Article provides suggestions as to how to 
remediate the identified threats to the equal pay doctrine. 
A.  EQUAL PAY AS A RIGHT AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The European Union (“EU”) has been committed to equality since the 
1957 Treaty of Rome.1  Generally, sex discrimination has always been 
prohibited in the TFEU.2  Specifically, Article 157 (ex 143, 119) of the 
TFEU prohibits disparate treatment between men and women in regard to 
equal pay on an economic basis.3  However, in contrast to many provisions 
of the TFEU, Article 157 (ex 141, 119) does not maintain an interstate 
equality requirement and is, thus, independent of the provisions of the 
TFEU that concern the free movement of workers.4  Regardless, the 
principle of pay equality is broadly interpreted in EU law.5  The scope of 
EU law on the subject of pay and sex equality has altered the legal 
landscape of Europe, which includes both the EU and the European Free 
Trade Area (“EFTA”).6  Together, the EU and the EFTA comprise the 
European Economic Area (“EEA”).7  Gender equality is a fundamental 
right within the EEA.8  Even Switzerland, which is not a member-state of 
the EEA, has adopted an equal pay policy in regard to gender equality.9  
This is an important reality because the entire EEA must follow the 
precedents of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”).10 
 
1.  Jill Rubery, Pay, Gender and the Social Dimension to Europe, 30 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 
605, 605 (1992). 
2.  MARGOT HORSPOOL & MATTHEW HUMPHREYS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 513 (Nicola 
Padfield, ed., 7th ed. 2012). 
3.  Id. 
4.  JAMES D. DINNAGE & JEAN-LUC LAFFINEUR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 1016 (3d ed. 2012). 
5.  Ingeborg Heide, Sex Equality and Social Security: Selected Rulings of the European 
Court of Justice, 143 INT’L LAB. REV. 299, 339 (2004). 
6.  Id. at 299. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Id. at 338. 
9.  Roland Erne & Natalie Imboden, Equal Pay by Gender and by Nationality: A 
Comparative Analysis of Switzerland’s Unequal Equal Pay Policy Regimes Across Time, 39 
CAMBRIDGE J.  ECON. 655, 655 (2015). 
10.  Heide, supra note 5, at 299. 
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Experienced by men and women, differential pay has negatively 
affected women in the labor market and, in turn, has also affected the 
general power and status of women.11  Lower pay for women on a 
comparable work level has also increased the economic dependence of 
women.12  By the mid-1970s, one of the most obvious employment trends 
in Europe was the integration of women into the workforce, especially 
during the second half of the Twentieth Century.13  A number of EU 
member-states were experiencing an increase in activism by women which 
eventually led to the adoption of progressive legislation on the subject of 
equal pay for women.14  It, thus, became clear to EU officials that equal pay 
legislation was a must, but there existed some debate as to the best process 
and form for doing so.15  When crafting the legislation, EU officials 
engaged in purposeful discussions with leading women’s organizations.16 
The concept of equal pay has been called a human right.17  The 
definition of a gender pay gap is the difference between men’s and 
women’s average gross earnings, divided by the average of men’s gross 
earnings.18  Equal pay, as a doctrine, is a legal requirement in most 
countries with liberal market economies.19  There is little doubt that the 
anti-discrimination legislation has pushed to narrow the gender pay gap 
over the last forty years.20  However, public policies to narrow the gaps in 
labor realities between men and women have a controversial past.21  The 
social systems of the EU member-states were developed over many years 
with different cultures, traditions, and history, yet only recently did these 
social systems begin to divorce themselves from the traditional models of 
male and female roles.22  Regardless of this shift, however, women still 
engage in more domestic work than their male counterparts.23  The 1975 
 
11.  Virginija Grybaite, Analysis of Theoretical Approaches to Gender Pay Gap, 7 J.  BUS. 
ECON. MGMT. 85, 85 (2006). 
12.  Id. 
13.  TIM BALE, EUROPEAN POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 31 (3d ed. 2013). 
14.  FRANCESCO DUINA, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF FREE TRADE 110 (2006). 
15.  Id. at 113. 
16.  Id. at 114. 
17.  Mark Smith, Social Regulation of the Gender Pay Gap in the EU, 18 EUR. J.  INDUS. 
REL. 365, 376 (2012). 
18.  Id. at 366. 
19.  Erne & Imboden, supra note 9, at 658. 
20.  Marie Drolet & Karen Mumford, The Gender Pay Gap for Private-Sector Employees in 
Canada and Britain, 50 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 529, 529 (2012). 
21.  David Neumark & Wendy A. Stock, The Labor Market Effects of Sex and Race 
Discrimination Laws, 44 ECON. INQUIRY 385, 385 (2006). 
22.  Heide, supra note 5, at 299-300. 
23.  BALE, supra note 13, at 33. 
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Equal Pay Directive (“Directive 75/117”) was the result of the changing 
social systems and the activism felt in Europe, which requires equal pay for 
work of equal value and allows for comparisons of pay rates across sex-
segregated populations.24  Since the EU adopted the Equal Pay Directive, 
jurisprudence from the ECJ has modified and broadened the scope of the 
general equal pay doctrine.25 
The integration of Europe, through EU law, has further pushed the 
debate on social progress across the continent.26  The EU has been a force 
in promoting gender equality.27  This is difficult to do given that reward 
systems can be cultural and vary across member-states in regard to the 
“width of pay differentials, ranking of jobs by pay, and the various 
principles of pay determination.”28  Although the EU has shown a strong 
constitutional commitment to gender equality, the political debate on the 
subject still exists.29  Despite the continued integration of Europe and the 
promotion of gender equality, there is comment that perhaps a one-size-fits 
all approach to gender equality may not work in the EU.30  As additional 
member-states have joined the EU, the desire for strengthened legislation to 
combat pay inequality has diminished.31  Additionally, several decades of 
equal pay legislation and caselaw have not completely erased the gender 
pay gap across the member-states.32  One study found that, although the 
gender gap has been stable in the EU, the gap varies from a high of almost 
thirty percent in Estonia to 4.4% in Slovenia.33  Across the EU, women 
make an average of 17.4% less than their male counterparts.34  However, 
the financial crisis in Europe has, ironically, been credited with somewhat 
closing the gender-based equality gap.35 
 
24.  Smith, supra note 17, at 367. 
25.  Jacqueline O’Reilly et al., Equal Pay as a Moving Target: International Perspectives on 
Forty-Years of Addressing the Gender Pay Gap, 39 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 299, 300 (2015). 
26.  Rubery, supra note 1, at 605. 
27.  Smith, supra note 17, at 367. 
28.  Rubery, supra note 1, at 606. 
29.  Christopher D. Totten, Constitutional Precommitments to Gender Affirmative Action in 
the European Union, Germany, Canada and the United States: A Comparative Approach, 21 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 27, 60 (2003). 
30.  Smith, supra note 17, at 368. 
31.  Id. at 365. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. at 366. 
34.  Joanne Deschenaux, Pay Gaps Persist Throughout Europe, 54 HUM. RES. MAG. 97, 97 
(2009). 
35.  Smith, supra note 17 at 366. 
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B. EQUAL PAY AND THE IMPACT OF DISCRIMINATION 
In the world of employment, women workers face several hurdles and 
disadvantages that can affect salary.  One problem women face in regard to 
pay inequality is occupational segregation which not only affects women in 
Europe, but around the world.36  Such a reality has been called “crowding” 
whereby women are limited to only a few occupations and, thus, the labor 
supply is higher than normal which pushes down the salaries of workers in 
those occupations.37  Some crowding seems to exist in careers that are 
focused on caring, nurturing, and service, whereas men dominate manual 
and technical occupations.38  There is evidence that women are more 
affected by a poor economy than men if layoffs, outsourcing, and stagnant 
wages are taken into consideration.39  There also exists evidence that 
women are disadvantaged by claims of being over-educated, over-skilled, 
and/or assigned to a less demanding or unstable position.40  In contrast, 
women are more likely to interrupt their careers and, subject to the 
prevailing social model, may accumulate less training, education, and 
experience; therefore, limiting their advancement.41  In turn, employers may 
be less attracted to female workers, not because of their gender, but because 
of the reality that the employer may be required to invest more in the female 
worker through advanced training and education.42  Moreover, there is a 
lack of international opportunities for women.43  However, there is 
comment that the closure of the education gap has also helped close the 
gender pay gap.44  Women are more likely to be in positions whereby they 
can opt out of work and experience the double burden of motherhood and 
work.45  Relatedly, the gender pay gap may be the result of the 
undervaluing of work traditionally performed by women.46  These 
differences in how work is valued affect women even in retirement, because 
 
36.  Grybaite, supra note 11, at 89. 
37.  Id. at 87. 
38.  Id. at 89. 
39.  Elizabeth D. MacGillivray et al., Legal Developments: Gender Issues Now, and 
Increasingly in the U.S. and EU Spotlight, 28 GLOBAL BUS. & ORG. EXCELLENCE 79, 83 (2009). 
40.  Hugo Figueiredo et al., Gender Pay Gaps and the Restructuring of Graduate Labour 
Markets in Southern Europe, 39 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 565, 567 (2015). 
41.  Grybaite, supra note 11, at 86. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Margaret Linehan, Senior Female International Managers: Empirical Evidence from 
Western Europe, 13 INT’L J. HUM. RES. MGMT 802, 813 (2002). 
44.  O’Reilly et al., supra note 25, at 302. 
45.  MacGillivray et al., supra note 39, at 81. 
46.  O’Reilly et al., supra note 25, at 301. 
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retirement benefits are calculated largely based on wages earned while 
working.47 
Despite the fact that women make up a large share of the workforce, 
pay inequality persists and wage discrimination continues.48  There exists 
comment that human capital attributes play a role in the development of 
gender pay gaps.49  Where these pay gaps exist between men and women, 
but are not explained by human capital, it is likely that the pay gap is due to 
discrimination.50  Economic pay discrimination exists where two people are 
paid different amounts, yet possess the same qualifications.51  According to 
Eyraud, a social science researcher, there are three “stages” in regard to the 
scope and application of equal pay legislation used to attack economic pay 
discrimination, including equal pay for the same job, equal pay for jobs of 
comparable worth, and apply equal pay legislation to combat indirect 
discrimination whereby unequal value is placed on structural differences 
associated with the nature of a female worker’s employment.52  Comparable 
worth examines equality across different jobs, even if the jobs have very 
different tasks.53  One problem associated with equal pay legislation is 
quantifying and calculating the value of equal pay in regard to different 
occupations.54  The equal pay for equal work standard could be applied to 
work with an equal market value.55  If, however, a reviewing court or 
member-state (through the use of legislation) wishes to use comparable 
worth as a standard, such an argument is only valid if one believes the pay 
inequity in question is a result unrelated to human capital requirements.56  
Job evaluation studies can assist reviewing courts in determining value 
differences and similarities between different jobs with comparable worth.57 
 
47.  Grybaite, supra note 11, at 85. 
48.  Id. 
49.  Figueiredo et al., supra note 40, at 566. 
50.  Grybaite, supra note 11, at 86. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Francois Eyraud, Equal Pay and the Value of Work in Industrialized Countries, 132 
INDUS. LABOUR REV. 33, 34 (1993). 
53.  Paula England, The Case for Comparable Worth, 39 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 743, 743-44 
(1999) (in her work, the author noted that the countries studied including Sweden, Denmark, and 
Finland are members of the EU and EEA, and that Norway and Iceland are members of EFTA and 
the EEA). 
54.  Eyraud, supra note 52, at 33-34. 
55.  Id. at 41. 
56.  England, supra note 53, at 748. 
57.  Id. at 744. 
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C.  ENFORCEMENT OF THE EQUAL PAY DOCTRINE IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
It is not simply the governments of the member-states, the EU itself, or 
the ECJ and national courts that are responsible for engaging in activities to 
promote equal pay for equal work, although pay regulation has been 
credited with narrowing the pay gap between men and women in some 
member-states.58  The use of trade groups and social partners may be chief 
allies in efforts to reduce the pay gap between men and women in the EU.59  
The presence of trade unions has narrowed the pay gap between men and 
women through collective bargaining agreements which adhere to the 
concept of equal pay.60  Trade unions in the U.K. have scored especially 
significant victories for workers in regard to equal pay.61  Problematically, 
gains made by women through collective bargaining agreements have not 
been converted into victories for women in non-unionized sectors.62 
Moreover, although firms themselves have been associated with 
causing gender pay gaps, there are efforts to find ways to lure new parents 
back to work in an attempt to prevent the loss of valuable talent.63  There 
exists an incentive for firms to take such an affirmative approach, because 
failing to address pay inequality can lead to expensive litigation, even in the 
EU.64  Gains associated with the retention of female employees have been 
supported by firms providing child care, flexible hours, and maternity 
leave.65  Female workers are having fewer children and those with 
advanced degrees are becoming less likely to have any children.66  When 
firms get women involved in more senior levels of work, employers protect 
themselves against potential talent shortages occurring in the upcoming 
years.67  More importantly, as women progress in their careers, their 
financial positions improve and they become more motivated as the projects 
they work on become more interesting.68 
In regard to the EU specifically, there is argument that, regionally, the 
Scandinavian members of the EEA have done the best at integrating and 
 
58.  Rubery, supra note 1, at 613. 
59.  Smith, supra note 17, at 376. 
60.  Id. at 370. 
61.  Hazel Conley, Trade Unions, Equal Pay, and the Law in the UK, 35 ECON. & INDUS. 
DEMOCRACY 309, 309 (2014). 
62.  Id. at 311. 
63.  MacGillivray et al., supra note 39, at 79; Drolet & Mumford, supra note 20, at 529-30. 
64.  O’Reilly et al., supra note 25, at 302. 
65.  See MacGillivray et al., supra note 39, at 82-83. 
66.  Id. at 80. 
67.  Id. at 82. 
68.  Id. at 81. 
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protecting women in the employment world.69  Regardless of whether 
firms, governments, trade unions, or individuals attempt to close the gender 
pay gap, the gap will not close until the EU and the member-states have 
matching priorities on the subject matter.70  One estimate is that full pay 
equality will not be achieved until 2058.71 
Problematically, gender pay differences have been studied primarily on 
a country-by-country basis.72  Despite the fact that twenty-eight member-
states that make up the EU are tied together by a common body of law, 
international comparisons on the gender pay gap are complicated and 
require not only an examination of law but also an inquiry into employment 
structures and reward systems in each country.73 
Comparatively, the EU has attacked indirect discrimination with its 
constitutional provisions, whereas the United States has a legal corpus that 
only applies to purposeful discrimination.74  The treaties that have formed 
the constitutional basis of the EU have always maintained an article (Article 
157, ex 143, 119) concerning gender equality.75  The United States 
Constitution does not reference gender equality.76  Thus, in the United 
States, a lack of constitutional commitment to gender equality has made it 
difficult for the United States Supreme Court to promote gender equality 
and support affirmative action.77  However, decisions by the Supreme Court 
have gone a long way in eliminating the debate on gender equality through 
the Court’s use of a high level of judicial scrutiny applied to government 
policies that create inequality of the sexes.78  This is not to say that the 
constitutional commitment the EU has made to pay equality is not without 
criticism.  There is comment that the “soft law” approach that the EU has 
taken has allowed for too much flexibility for each member-state as they are 
free to craft their own implementing legislation which meets their specific 
conditions and needs.79  One argument is that the EU’s use of Directives as 
a legislative tool represents a piecemeal approach and is not effective at 
narrowing the pay separation between men and women in the EU.80 
 
69.  BALE, supra note 13, at 31-32. 
70.  Smith, supra note 17, at 368. 
71.  O’Reilly et al., supra note 25, at 302. 
72.  Rubery, supra note 1, at 606. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Totten, supra note 29, at 27. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. at 52. 
77.  Id. at 28. 
78.  Id. at 52, 61. 
79.  Smith, supra note 17, at 368. 
80.  Rubery, supra note 1, at 618. 
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II.   THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE 
The principle purpose of this Article is to discover the various forms of 
compensation and remuneration that qualifies under the term “pay,” 
pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119) according to the caselaw of the ECJ.  
Second, this Article seeks to determine what discretion a member-state has 
when structuring its pension systems.  Third, this Article seeks to acquaint 
the reader, including international employers and employees, with the 
various rules concerning the right to equal pay in the EU, which includes 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and various EU Directives.  Fourth, and lastly, 
this Article wishes to provide suggestions to the EU regarding how to 
further strengthen the right to equal pay for equal work across the various 
member-states that constitute the EU. 
III. THE DECISIONS OF THE ECJ REGARDING THE RIGHT TO 
EQUAL PAY 
The decisions by the ECJ on the topic of equal pay includes a wide 
variety of topics including covering the scope of employment within the EU 
based on both intentional and unintentional discrimination by both member-
states and employers.  The ECJ has made decisions concerning the 
definition of pay, pay equality, retirement benefits, maternity leave, 
redundancy pay, pension rights, service credits, government social policy, 
public servant status, and collective bargaining agreements. 
A.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 157 AND EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK 
STANDARD 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) requires that employers operating within EU 
member-states pay their employees equally, based on gender, for equal 
work or work of equal value.81  The quintessential case that evaluates 
 
81.  Article 173 (ex 157 TEC) states: 
1.  The Union and the Member States shall ensure that the conditions necessary for the 
competitiveness of the Union’s industry exist.  For that purpose, in accordance with a 
system of open and competitive markets, their action shall be aimed at: - speeding up 
the adjustment of industry to structural changes, - encouraging an environment 
favourable to initiative and to the development of undertakings throughout the Union, 
particularly small and medium-sized undertakings, - encouraging an environment 
favourable to cooperation between undertakings, - fostering better exploitation of the 
industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and technological development. 
2.  The Member States shall consult each other in liaison with the Commission and, 
where necessary, shall coordinate their action.  The Commission may take any useful 
initiative to promote such coordination, in particular initiatives aiming at the 
establishment of guidelines and indicators, the organisation of exchange of best 
practice, and the preparation of the necessary elements for periodic monitoring and 
evaluation.  The European Parliament shall be kept fully informed.  3.  The Union 
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Article 157 is Defrenne v. SABENA.82  The most important aspect of the 
Defrenne case was that the ECJ found the guarantees under Article 157 to 
be directly effective against the member-states and employers that operate 
within the member-states, thus requiring the several national courts to 
recognize its protections even if the legislatures of the member-states and/or 
the legislative branches of the EU had not acted accordingly.83  More 
problematically, especially for plaintiffs unlike Ms. Defrenne, as the facts 
of the case at bar reflect, the direct effect condition does not apply to 
plaintiffs that might file actions against their employers for retroactive 
violations unless they had already filed at the time of the Defrenne decision 
(obviously, plaintiffs could file freely for violations occurring after the 
Defrenne decision of 1976).84 
The Defrenne plaintiff was an airline stewardess who, between 1961 
and 1968, was paid noticeably less than her male counterparts.85  In 1968, 
however, pursuant to a provision in the collective bargaining agreement that 
covered her employment (SABENA), she left her position because she 
reached the age of forty.86  Shortly after her mandatory retirement, she filed 
a claim in a Belgian court for back pay, pursuant to Article 157, due to her 
lower and disparate pay in relation to her male co-workers.87 
The ECJ spent most of its opinion discussing the scope and merits of 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119).88  Specifically, one of the chief responsibilities of 
national courts, and the ECJ itself, is to enforce Article 157 (ex 141, 119) to 
ensure that firms and member-state governments that have adhered to its 
requirements do not suffer a comparative disadvantage against firms and 
 
shall contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out in paragraph 1 through the 
policies and activities it pursues under other provisions of the Treaties.  The European 
Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, may decide on 
specific measures in support of action taken in the Member States to achieve the 
objectives set out in paragraph 1, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member States.  This Title shall not provide a basis for the 
introduction by the Union of any measure which could lead to a distortion of 
competition or contains tax provisions or provisions relating to the rights and interests 
of employed persons. 
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 173, Oct. 26, 
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
82.  Case 43/75, Defrenne v. SABENA, 1976 E.C.R. 0455. 
83.  Id. ¶ 2 (“Ruling”). 
84.  Id. ¶ 4. 
85.  Id. ¶ 2 (“Grounds”). 
86.  Id. ¶ 26.  The Court, however, did not deliver an opinion on Ms. Defrenne’s mandatory 
retirement. 
87.  Id. ¶ 7. 
88  Defrenne, E.C.R. 0455, ¶ 1 (“Ruling”). 
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member-state governments that have not followed its mandates.89  
Secondly, the requirement of equal pay is important to the social progress 
and improved standard of living missions behind the EU.90  Regardless, the 
ECJ stated that national courts in the EU must guarantee that during the 
process of harmonizing EU law, Article 157 (ex 141, 119) is recognized.91  
Additionally, the ECJ commented that national courts in the EU must 
confirm that the protections of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) are afforded even 
when collective bargaining agreements dictate otherwise.92 
In the end, although the ECJ did not specifically state as such, Ms. 
Defrenne and plaintiffs that had already filed claims at the time of the 
decision, could recover for back pay if they were successful in their claims 
because the provisions of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) were to be fully 
recognized by January 1, 1962.93 
In Fletcher v. Clay Cross Limited, the British Court of Appeals 
attempted to mesh the United Kingdom’s Equal Pay Act of 1970 with 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119).94  The Plaintiff, Ms. Fletcher, was working as a 
sales clerk with two others in the same position, a man and another woman, 
for less pay than her male counterpart, but was paid the same amount as her 
female counterpart.95  Initially, she was paid eight pounds less per week 
than her newly hired male counterpart because the latter would not accept 
less than forty-three pounds per week, which was what he was making with 
his old employer.96  Shortly after the male’s hiring, the employer raised all 
wages by six pounds per week, which still left the disparity in place at eight 
pounds per week.97  The defendant firm then raised the wages of the two 
women, but not the male employee, by almost two and one half pounds per 
week, pursuant to a study of the value of work at the workplace.98  It was at 
this point that Ms. Fletcher brought a claim of pay discrimination against 
her employer under the British Equal Pay Act.99 
All three Judges wrote opinions that were unanimous in finding that 
Ms. Fletcher’s employer had violated the Equal Pay Act of 1970.100  Lord 
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Denning found that there were no material differences between Ms. 
Fletcher and her male counterpart that would justify the disparity in 
salary.101  Such arguments made by the employer to justify the disparity in 
pay, such as the lack of a suitable labor pool and/or the higher amount of 
salary was required because it was equal to what the male worker was 
making at his old place of employment were immediately discounted as 
unsuitable excuses.102  Additionally, Lord Denning borrowed from 
American jurisprudence on the American Equal Pay Act of 1963 in holding 
that a British employer could be held responsible for a violation, even if it 
was not the employer’s goal to discriminate.103 
Lord Lawton, after extensive recitation of both British and American 
jurisprudence on the issue of equal pay based on gender, found that even if 
the employer were able to use, as a justification, the lack of a labor pool for 
the sales clerk position, a labor shortage did not exist in this particular case 
when three applicants applied for the job but only one was interviewed and 
hired (the male applicant).104  Perhaps most importantly, Lord Lawton 
noted that although British and American jurisprudence allows for grounds 
to pay men and women disparately if unrelated to gender, the United 
Kingdom Equal Pay Act disallows such grounds.105  Relatedly, both Lord 
Denning and Lord Lawton stressed the need to keep domestic law and 
TFEU law harmonious.106 
Lord Browne similarly held that although it was not the intent of the 
employer to discriminate on the basis of gender when paying Ms. Fletcher 
and the male counterpart, the very effect of disparate pay leads to a 
violation of the British law.107 
B.  INDIRECT DISCRIMINATION 
In one of its more prescriptive cases, Regina v. Seymour-Smith and 
Perez, four prominent questions were raised and answered by the ECJ 
regarding the doctrine of equal pay for equal work.108  As one might 
imagine, the use of statistics is an extremely effective way to show that a 
member-state’s policy has a disparate impact on men or women.  In 
Seymour-Smith & Perez, while answering the first question, the ECJ stated 
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that to show a member-state’s policy reflects indirect discrimination and 
thus a violation of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), a national court must verify 
that the statistics reflect that a considerably smaller percentage of women 
than men are able to fulfill the requirements of that member-state’s 
policy.109  However, even if indirect discrimination is shown through a 
statistically considerable difference, if a member-state can show that the 
policy is justifiable by other objective factors, none of which are related to 
gender, then indirect discrimination does not exist.110 
According to the ECJ, the first step in determining whether indirect 
discrimination exists in violation of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) is to discover 
whether the policy in question creates a more unfavorable impact on 
women than men.111  Second, when using statistics, a reviewing court must 
determine that there are proper proportions of men and women to compare 
in regard to the policy in question; however, it is not sufficient to look at the 
number of people affected because that might depend on the number and 
percentage of people working in the member-state.112  Third, the national 
court must establish that the statistics reveal a relatively constant disparity 
between men and women over a long period of time to find a case of sex-
based discrimination.113  Specific to the facts in Seymour-Smith & Perez, 
the ECJ found that when a member-state policy affects 77.4% of men, but 
only 68.9% of women, such figures do not show that a considerably smaller 
percentage of women are more unfavorably disadvantaged, which reflects 
indirect discrimination in violation of Article 157 (ex 141, 119).114 
The plaintiffs in Seymour-Smith & Perez believed that they were 
unfairly dismissed and submitted a claim to a U.K. administrative court 
assigned with determining whether an employee had been unfairly 
dismissed, and if such a finding resulted, was charged with issuing one of 
two remedies, including reinstatement or compensation.115  According to 
U.K. law at the time, an employee who believed he or she has been 
terminated unjustly could petition the administrative court, so long as the 
employee had maintained employment for a total of two years.116  Both 
plaintiffs had worked for their employers for roughly one and one-half 
years, but had not worked the full two years as required by U.K. law, which 
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would enable them to petition the administrative court.117  The plaintiffs 
argued that Article 157 (ex 141, 119) was violated by the U.K.’s two-year 
policy in that it adversely affected more women than men.118 
The second significant question asked in Seymour-Smith & Perez was 
whether a judicial award of compensation in an unfair dismissal case was 
within the scope of pay pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119).119  Although 
the plaintiffs contended that this question should be answered in the 
affirmative, the U.K. government suggested that such compensation was 
outside the scope of pay and was merely a remedy for an employer’s breach 
of a working condition.120  The ECJ held, however, that Article 157’s 
definition of pay included various forms of consideration, even indirect 
consideration, as the result of employment.121  While examining its own 
jurisprudence, the ECJ remarked that it had previously held that 
compensation may be received when an employee is terminated.122  To 
answer the second question, the ECJ held that compensation from an 
administrative court, in the form of both an actual award and a 
compensatory award, is designed to give the employee what he or she 
would have received had the employer not unfairly terminated his or her 
employment, and was within the scope of the term “pay” for purposes of 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119).123  On this point, the ECJ further strengthened its 
holding by stating that compensation received through a statutory right, 
such as the case here in the form of a judicial award, would be treated the 
same as if the compensation was directly received by an employee pursuant 
to an employment contract.124 
The third question posed to the ECJ concerned technical grounds of 
law and the separation of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and Directive 76/207.125  
According to the ECJ, when an applicant is seeking reinstatement from an 
administrative court for unfair dismissal, Directive 76/207, which pertains 
more so to working conditions including the possibility of dismissal and the 
right to take up employment, applies.126  However, when an employee who 
believes he or she has been unfairly dismissed and is seeking financial 
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compensation for lost remuneration, Article 157 (ex 141, 119) applies.127  
In the case at bar, because the plaintiffs were seeking financial 
compensation, the case should be governed by Article 15 Article 157 (ex 
141, 119) 7.128 
The fourth question in Seymour-Smith & Perez centered on what would 
substantiate an objective justification by a member-state for the purpose of 
indirect discrimination.129  The ECJ stated that if a member-state is able to 
show that its social policy, espoused in legislation, is suitable and necessary 
for achieving that aim, then even if the legislation far more negatively 
affects women than men, the legislation in question does not violate Article 
157 (ex 141, 119).130  In regard to the facts of the case at bar, the ECJ found 
that the social policy in question, creating a two-year time period before an 
employee can bring a claim for unfair dismissal to encourage the 
recruitment of employees who wish to stay with the employer for a long 
period, was a legitimate aim for a member-state’s social policy.131  
Regardless of the legitimate aim, a member-state must take into account 
other means by which to achieve that social policy.132  Although the ECJ 
specified that member-states should have broad discretion when 
determining the best legislative methods by which to achieve its social and 
employment policies, this discretion cannot be exercised in a way that 
frustrates the spirit of EU law.133  In such cases, the member-state has the 
burden of proof to show that its use of discretion when developing its social 
policy through legislation is not related to discrimination based on gender 
and must also justify the means chosen to achieve its legislative aims.134  
Here, the ECJ believed that a mere concern in regard to the recruitment of 
employees was not enough to justify the two-year rule in British law and 
immunize this legislative aim by a blanket finding that it is unrelated to 
gender discrimination.135 
C.  RETIREMENT PLANS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
In another early case, Worringham v. Lloyd’s Bank, the ECJ not only 
addressed the issue of retirement contributions as a form of “pay” in regard 
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to Article 157 (ex 141, 119), but also the temporal effect of an ECJ 
decision, finding an employer’s breach of Article 157 (ex 141, 119).136  The 
plaintiffs in Worringham believed that their employer violated the tenets of 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119)  and Directives 75/117 and 76/207 because the 
employer required male employees to contribute 5% toward their pension 
plans, paid the male employees an extra 5%, yet immediately deducted that 
same additional 5% of salary.137  Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that 
the employer moved that money directly into the pension fund while female 
employees were not required to pay 5% toward their pension account but 
were not paid the additional 5% as the male employees were nor was 5% 
deducted from the female workers’ pay.138  Although this dual retirement 
contribution system did not yield a direct difference in regard to the pension 
system, the additional 5% paid to the male employees affected other 
benefits associated with employment including redundancy payments, 
unemployment benefits, family allowances, contributions equivalent 
premiums, and mortgage and credit facilities.139 
The ECJ made it clear that pension contributions are considered within 
the scope of the term “pay” for the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), 
which includes ordinary wages and salaries, cash, and in-kind contributions 
that an employee receives either directly or indirectly from an employer.140  
Furthermore, also within the scope of the term “pay” would be the benefits 
that accrue from having a larger salary, even if that additional salary is 
deducted from a worker’s take-home pay because that additional salary 
increases other salary-related benefits and/or social benefits.141  
Additionally, the ECJ found the employer to have violated Directive 75/117 
in implementing the dual retirement contribution system as that Directive 
applies to the same work in which the male and female employees were 
engaged in Worringham.142 
Given that Worringham was an early case, the ECJ was charged with 
determining whether Article 157 (ex 141, 119) had direct effect, meaning 
that member-states had to adhere to the principle of equal pay for equal 
work, without implementing legislation when applied to retirement plans.143  
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According to the ECJ, the unequal gross pay, despite the immediate 
deduction that male workers face for which that amount is contributed to 
their pension accounts, is an intolerable source of discrimination that 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) was envisioned to extinguish.144  The ECJ held 
that Article 157 (ex 141, 119) was directly effective and thus member-state 
governments are charged with making sure the equal pay for equal work 
doctrine is adhered to within their political boundaries.145  As well, national 
courts may rely on Article 157 (ex 141, 119) without implementing 
legislation to provide relief to plaintiffs when there exists disparity in 
relation to retirement plans.146 
Lastly, the ECJ was required to decide whether their holding, that the 
employer in the case at bar had violated Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and 
Directive 75/117, would be limited in scope of time so that additional 
plaintiffs could not come forth alleging gender discrimination in regard to 
the equal pay for equal work doctrine.147  The ECJ stated there were two 
reasons, both required, as to why a judgment should not apply retroactively 
including that, first, the employers in a similar situation and the member-
states were led to believe over a long period of time that their prior 
discriminatory actions were not violating the tenets of Article 157 (ex 141, 
119).148  Second, there existed policy reasons as to why retroactive effect 
would not be desirable due to the existence of important questions of legal 
certainty that could affect many other parties other than the litigants.149  
Regardless, the ECJ found that neither of these conditions existed and 
refused to place a temporal restriction on their judgment in Worringham.150 
D.  RETIREMENT PLANS AND AGE DIFFERENCES 
The focus of Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange was the difference 
between the pension ages of men and women and the relationship between a 
member-state’s statutory pension system and a privately managed pension 
system.151  In Barber, the plaintiffs included an estate and the widow of a 
deceased employee who was made redundant by his employer at an age 
whereby he was only eligible for a deferred pension, a statutory redundancy 
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payment, and an ex gratia payment from his employer.152  The worker in 
question, Mr. Barber, was employed by Guardian which maintained a 
wholly funded pension system with no employee contributions but, 
according to the provisions of the pension, male workers were not eligible 
for a pension until age sixty-two, whereas female workers were eligible at 
age fifty-seven.153  The statutory pension system, as crafted by the U.K. 
government, allowed men to retire with a pension at sixty-five and women 
at sixty.154  Workers at Guardian, pursuant to the pension system, were 
eligible for a deferred pension if they had reached at least age forty and had 
worked for the firm for at least ten years.155  However, workers facing 
redundancy could gain an immediate pension at age fifty-five, if male, and 
fifty, if female, at the time of the redundancy declaration.156  As for the 
facts in the case at bar, Mr. Barber was declared redundant at age fifty-two 
making him eligible only for a deferred pension, yet his female counterpart 
would have been eligible for an immediate pension under the same 
circumstances.157 
The ECJ in Barber put forth several rules concerning the interplay 
between different ages for different work-related benefits and pension 
systems either crafted by an employer or a member-state.  First, the ECJ 
held that pay associated with a declaration of redundancy is within the 
scope of the term “pay” pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119).158  
According to the ECJ, compensation related to a finding of redundancy, be 
it from a contract provision, a statutory provision, or via an ex gratia 
payment, is still pay for the purposes of Article 119, which requires 
compensation equality between men and women.159  In regard to ex gratia 
payments which an employer makes without an obligation to do so, Article 
157 (ex 141, 119) still requires equality.160  Second, the ECJ stated that 
pension benefits are included within the scope of Article 157’s term “pay” 
even if the employer contracts with a private entity to manage the pension 
scheme.161  Relatedly, the pension benefits in question are still within the 
guise of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) despite the fact that the pension corpus is 
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managed in the form of a trust and administered by trustees which are 
independent of the employer.162  The ECJ contended that because the 
privately-contracted pension system fulfills the same function as a statutory 
pension system, and also because the contributions paid by employees to 
the private pension fund in lieu of being paid to the government-sponsored 
pension system, Article 157 (ex 141, 119) would encompass the former.163 
The fourth point made by the ECJ in Barber may have been the most 
significant.  The ECJ held that in cases whereby an employee is declared 
redundant, Article 157 is violated if there are different ages assigned to men 
and women for eligibility for an immediate pension.164  On the issue of 
pensions associated with redundancy declarations before the age of pension 
eligibility, the ECJ was chiefly concerned with transparency in that 
member-states and that their associated national courts have a responsibility 
to eliminate all discrimination on grounds of gender, including making sure 
judicial review was possible and effective.165  Relatedly, the ECJ charged 
national courts with assessing and comparing all possible forms of 
compensation, pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119).166  The ECJ also 
found Article 157 (ex 141, 119) directly effective, requiring equality in 
regard to pension systems; thus, national courts can use Article 157 (ex 141, 
119) without implementing legislation from a member-state to hold various 
forms of compensation systems intolerable when one gender is adversely 
affected.167  Furthermore, the ECJ found the privately-contracted pension 
scheme to violate Article 157 (ex 141, 119) due to the different pension 
eligibility ages between men and women even if there was an age-eligibility 
difference associated with the government-sponsored pension system.168 
E.  IN-KIND BENEFITS 
In a fairly short-winded case, the ECJ held that an employer violates 
Article 157 (ex 143, 119) if it grants in-kind benefits to male employees 
upon retirement, but fails to grant the same to female employees.169  In 
Garland v. British Rail, the ECJ found that Article 157 (ex 141, 119) 
covered in-kind benefits upon retirement in the form of free travel facilities 
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on railroads to the spouse and children of former railroad workers.170  The 
ECJ found a violation of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) although, pursuant to a 
contract, the employer was not obligated to provide such benefits to retired 
workers.171  The ECJ also commented that the nature of the benefits would 
be analyzed because there was a clear form of discrimination when male 
workers were afforded the free travel facilities, considered within the scope 
of pay for the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), yet female workers 
were.172  Interestingly enough, once the policy was deemed to have violated 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119), the ECJ did not find it necessary to determine if 
the employer’s policy violated either Directive 75/117 or 76/207.173 
Directive 2000/78 generally requires equal treatment in matters of 
employment and occupation, but does not apply to benefits that are the 
result of a member-state’s social security or social protection scheme or a 
payment from a member-state by which the design is to provide access to 
employment or the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119).174  Directive 
2000/78 specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, 
disability, age, or sexual orientation and requires equal treatment on matters 
of employment and occupation either by direct or indirect means.175  This 
Directive specifically addresses employment conditions, dismissals, pay, 
and working conditions whereby employers must treat employees equally 
based on the suspect classifications previously identified, but does not apply 
to payments made by the governments of member-states which, again, 
include social security or pension schemes.176  In Germany v. Dittrich, the 
ECJ was asked to determine if statutorily-mandated assistance provided to 
public servants by the German government was within the scope of the 
equal treatment requirements of Directive 2000/78.177 
The German law in question provided various benefits, such as health 
care benefits (including benefits for maternity and illness-related 
conditions) for partners and other family members and to same-sex partners 
who were government employees.178  German law, however, was amended 
to exclude civil partners from the health care benefits provisions.179 
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According to the ECJ, Directive 2000/78 applies to all employees 
whether employed in the public or private sectors in regard to pay.180  As 
well, the ECJ held that health care benefits afforded to spouses and their 
family members are generally included within the term “pay” for the 
purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119).181  However, the ECJ stated that to 
determine if a benefit acquires the full protection from Article 157, the 
benefit must be afforded to the worker because of his or her employment 
and must be paid by the employer, specifically.182  In Dittrich, the ECJ held 
that because the health care benefits were part of Germany’s statutory 
regime, and not directly afforded to an employee from an employer, nor did 
the benefits supplement an existing social benefit, the health care benefits in 
this case, specifically, were not within the scope of “pay.”183  Regardless, 
the ECJ left the national courts to determine if the health care benefits in 
question, in a case like Dittrich, are funded by legislative mandate or by a 
public employer.184 
F. PART-TIME WORKERS AND PENSIONS 
In Jenkins v. Kingsgate, the ECJ entertained a referred question from a 
British administrative court as to whether an employer violated Article 157 
(ex 143, 119) by paying part-time workers a lower hourly rate than full-time 
workers when virtually all part-time workers were female.185  At one time, 
Kingsgate, the employer, paid both full-time (those working forty hours per 
week) and part-time workers the same hourly rate, yet, in 1975, it decided 
to pay a higher hourly wage to full-time workers.186  According to British 
law at the time, specifically the Equal Pay Act of 1970, employers were 
required to pay men and women equally when “a woman is employed in 
like work with a man in the same employment.”187  However, the British 
administrative court found that such equality was not required between 
male and female employees when an employer can prove a material 
difference between the contracts of the male and female workers and that 
material difference is unrelated to gender.188  The plaintiff, who was a part-
 
180.  Dittrich, E.C.R. 00000, ¶ 30. 
181.  Id. ¶ 36. 
182.  Id. ¶¶ 37, 40. 
183.  Id. ¶ 41. 
184.  Id. ¶ 43. 
185.  Case 96/80, Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Prods.) Ltd., 1981 E.C.R. 0911, ¶¶ 2, 3, 9 
(“Grounds”). 
186.  Id. ¶ 6. 
187.  Id. ¶ 3. 
188.  Id. ¶ 4. 
         
2017] CLOSING THE GENDER PAY GAP 437 
time worker, rested much of her case on the fact that all but one part-time 
employee was male and that male employee had just recently retired and 
was allowed to return performing brief stints of work.189 
The ECJ held that a mere difference in hourly pay rates between part-
time and full-time workers is not a per se violation of Article 157 (ex 141, 
119), assuming that the part-time and full-time pay rates are applied equally 
to male and female workers in those categories.190  However, the ECJ 
hinted that an employer would be required to show that the hourly pay rates 
were unrelated to sex discrimination and that the same pay rates were 
objectively justified on grounds such as encouraging full-time employment 
over part-time employment.191  The ECJ did, however, state that if an 
employer cannot show that, where a considerably smaller percentage of 
women are full-time employees due to the difficulties associated with 
arranging work schedules, there are reasons for the pay differentials 
unrelated to gender, Article 157 (ex 141, 119) would be infringed.192  The 
ECJ did allow the national courts to decide if the case facts and employer’s 
intention was to treat male and female workers differently through its 
remuneration policies.193 
In Bilka v. Weber von Hartz, the ECJ put forth several crucial 
statements about pensions, the differences between part-time and full-time 
employees, and employees’ rights to equal pay for equal work under Article 
157 (ex 141, 119).194  First, the ECJ held pension schemes that are not 
mandated by a member-state’s statutory provision, but instead, as the result 
of negotiations between a firm and its employees, are within the scope of 
Article 157’s “pay” term.195  Second, if the private sector firm excludes 
part-time workers from its pension system, and the pension system affects a 
far greater number of women than men, the pension system violates the 
requirements of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), unless the employer can show 
that the pension scheme is the result of objectively justified factors that are 
unrelated to gender discrimination.196  According to the ECJ, this is 
especially true if, in contrast to men, a much lower percentage of women 
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work full-time, and thus, make up a larger percentage of part-time workers 
when considering that women have greater difficulties in the work world.197 
Third, however, if an employer can show that the reason for excluding 
part-time workers from its pension system was to discourage part-time 
work and make full-time work more attractive, such a reason would 
constitute an objective reasonable factor under Article 157, and thus, not 
constitute a breach of the Article.198  The ECJ, in the case at bar, agreed 
with the employer that such a policy, in regard to its pension scheme with 
the design of promoting full-time work, was a policy irrespective of gender, 
and thus, appropriate to meet the firm’s objective.199  Interestingly, the 
respondent firm suggested that part-time employees are less likely to agree 
to work in the late afternoons and on Saturdays, and in order to ensure an 
adequate workforce, full-time employment was more likely to allow for 
coverage of those periods of time.200  As well, the ECJ stated that the 
European Commission has suggested that, in regard to the equal pay for 
equal work doctrine, member-states need not require employers within that 
member-state to account for the family responsibilities of their workers.201  
The stance by the ECJ and the Commission were in stark contrast to the 
arguments made by the plaintiff, Ms. Weber, who articulated that women 
suffer disadvantages in the workplace because of the exclusion of women 
from full-time work, and that when women take time to care for family 
members while working part-time, that period of part-time employment 
should be considered full-time employment for the purposes of an 
employer’s pension scheme.202  Regardless, the ECJ, agreeing with the 
European Commission, held that employers are under no obligation to craft 
a pension scheme that takes into consideration difficulties maintained by 
those with family obligations.203 
The ECJ did not dwell much on the facts of its Bilka decision.  Ms. 
Weber worked at Bilka, a department store chain, for fifteen years, but only 
worked full-time for the first eleven years, making her ineligible for a 
pension.204  The pension system negotiated between the workers at Bilka 
and the firm required fifteen years of full-time employment within a 
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twenty-year period.205  Although proffered by Bilka, yet without much 
notice by the ECJ, the firm stated that no discrimination occurred since the 
great majority (81.3%) of all pensions granted within its group were paid to 
women and only 72% of all employees at Bilka were women.206 
Perhaps the best articulation of the scope of direct discrimination in 
regard to Article 157 (ex 141, 119) is in Nikoloudi v. OTE.207  Pursuant to a 
collective bargaining agreement in Greece, only females could be part-time 
cleaners within the framework of a fixed-term contract, though, it was also 
possible to become a fixed-term contract worker if a cleaner were taking on 
the dependent of a deceased worker due to family problems resulting from 
the death.208  The plaintiff, Ms. Nikoloudi, a female cleaner, was hired as a 
part-time cleaner from 1978 until 1996, when her contract was converted to 
full-time, thus, making her eligible for a pension in 1998.209  She later 
brought an action in a Greek court alleging violation of Article 157 (ex 141, 
119), claiming that since she was limited to only part-time employment for 
eighteen years, she was disadvantaged, as evidenced by a lower pension 
payment.210 
The ECJ first contended that it did not make a difference that no male 
worker was engaged in the same work as the plaintiff and that she may still 
bring her claim for a violation of EU law, and, in regard to finding 
comparisons, the plaintiff need not to find workers engaged in exactly the 
same form of work to enforce the principle of equality.211  The defendant, 
OTE, a labor organization, argued that the part-time cleaner position was 
justified due to the small physical area needed for cleaning and that the 
position should be limited only to women to meet their specific needs.212  
Although the ECJ conceded that categories of workers can be reserved 
specifically for a particular gender and such a designation does not itself 
create a form of direct discrimination, the disadvantageous treatment of 
those in that gender-specific work category due to general unfavorable 
treatment as a worker or in regard to equal pay, does constitute direct 
discrimination.213  Problematically for the plaintiff, it was possible for a 
female worker to seek full-time employment, just as Ms. Nikoloudi had 
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done for the last two years, and, in conjunction with the fact that the same 
rate of pay existed for both part-time and full-time workers, ECJ found no 
direct discrimination.214  Relatedly, the ECJ also found that even if part-
time workers were paid a lower rate than full-time workers, but women 
were still eligible for full-time employment, no direct discrimination would 
exist so long as the employer could objectively justify the difference in pay 
between full-time and part-time workers, and that the difference was 
unrelated to gender.215  Additionally, despite the fact that part-time workers 
were paid less than their full-time counterparts, no direct discrimination 
existed, again, so long as full-time employment was open to women.216 
Despite its holding on the subject of direct discrimination, the ECJ held 
that if there is evidence that the gender-specific category of employment, 
here the reservation of part-time cleaning positions for women, has a 
disadvantageous effect on a particular gender, a claim of indirect 
discrimination can be substantiated.217  However, if an employer (or labor 
organization) can show that the disadvantageous impact on part-time 
workers is due to a reality not related to gender, then indirect discrimination 
does not exist.218  In regard to indirect discrimination, the ECJ stated that 
although member-states have flexibility making choices in regard to their 
social policies and social protection, these social systems cannot bring 
about discrimination based on gender.219 
For the ECJ, the length of service question, in regard to qualifying for a 
state pension, was much more challenging.  Here, the ECJ ruled that if the 
total exclusion of part-time employment for the purpose of calculating the 
length of service in regard to pension rights affects a much larger 
percentage of female workers than male workers, such a reality violates 
Directive 76/207 as a form of indirect discrimination, so long as the 
employer (or labor organization) cannot objectively justify its practices that 
create the disparity.220  Regardless of whether the cause of action is direct 
or indirect discrimination, however, the ECJ held that an employer (or labor 
organization) has the burden of proving that when a plaintiff claims that the 
principle of equal treatment has been infringed any adverse disparity is not 
due to gender.221 
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In Moreno v. I.N.S.S., the ECJ found the Spanish pension system not to 
be covered by Article 157 (ex 143, 119).222  According to the ECJ, pension 
systems that appear to be determined more so by considerations of social 
policy rather than the relationship between an employer and an employee 
are not covered by Article 157 (ex 141, 119).223  More specifically, because 
the pension system at issue in Moreno concerned social policy, member-
state organization, and budgetary concerns, and did not apply to one 
specific category of worker, Article 157 (ex 141, 119) was inapplicable.224  
The Spanish pension law in question created a pension for life when a 
person reaches 65 years of age, based on contributions for fifteen years.225  
The pension system did provide for part-time workers, so long as the part-
time worker contributed sufficiently based on hours worked, which 
included traditional employment and overtime hours.226  The plaintiff, Ms. 
Moreno, applied for a pension upon her retirement at age sixty-six, but was 
refused eligibility by the Spanish government because she had not fully 
contributed for fifteen years because she had only worked part-time, four 
hours per week, for eighteen years.227  Ms. Moreno, while filing a 
complaint with the Spanish administrative court, contended that the 
contribution system punished part-time workers in that they had to 
contribute for many more years to meet the fifteen-year equivalent rule, and 
thus, resulted in a form of indirect discrimination because 80% of part-time 
workers in Spain were female.228 
As previously stated, the ECJ began its opinion by stating that Article 
157 does not apply to a pension scheme which (1) is the creation of 
statutory authority of the member-state, (2) its creation is based on social 
policy, and (3) no bargaining exists between the employer and 
employee(s).229  However, the ECJ did find the Spanish pension system to 
violate Directive 79/7 because the system required a proportionally greater 
contribution by part-time employees in comparison to full-time employees 
given that the great majority of part-time employees are women.230  
Directive 79/7 requires equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
social security and provides specific protection in regard to age, which is 
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considered a “risk” by the Directive.231  More narrowly, Directive 79/7 
prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination on account of gender, 
marital status, family status in regard to pension schemes, contributions, 
calculations, related family benefits, and the retention and duration of 
benefits.232  The ECJ was clear that Directive 79/7 is violated when a 
member-state’s provision of law, although facially neutral, works to 
disadvantage far more women than men and, in this case, the ECJ found it 
to be indisputable that 80% of part-time workers are female.233  The ECJ 
did not accept the Spanish government’s argument that the contribution 
requirements and calculation systems were necessary to protect the social 
security system, even if it meant excluding many part-time workers, such as 
Ms. Moreno, from earning a lifetime pension.234 
G.  SUBCONTRACTORS AND OUTSOURCING OF EMPLOYMENT 
Perhaps the best case that explores the right to equal pay in cases 
involving part-time workers pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119), is 
Allonby v. Accrington & Rosendale College, largely because it is both 
recent and on point.235  In Allonby, a female, part-time lecturer filed a claim 
against the college where she taught and her direct employer (ELS) for 
violating Article 157 (ex 141, 119), when she learned that a male 
counterpart who held the same position was paid a higher salary by the 
college.236  At one time, Ms. Allonby had been working directly for the 
college, until budget cuts forced it to not renew her contract.237  However, 
she went to work for her new employer, ELS, which hired several of the 
part-time lecturers that were laid off by the college and Ms. Allonby ended 
up teaching the same classes at the college, but she was directly employed 
by ELS.238  Regardless, Ms. Allonby was paid less by ELS, essentially as a 
subcontractor, than her male counterpart who was paid by the college.239  In 
addition to filing a claim Article 157 (ex 141, 119), Ms. Allonby argued 
that the college and ELS violated the British Sex Discrimination Act of 
1975.240 
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Although the ECJ found that Ms. Allonby was a “worker” within the 
definition of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), she could not assert a claim under 
that Article for sex discrimination because she and her male counterpart had 
different employers, despite the fact that, physically, the two lecturers 
taught at the same educational institution.241  According to the ECJ, this is 
true even if the rate by which Ms. Allonby is paid is at least indirectly 
determined by what the college pays ELS to contract its services.242  To 
support its decision, the ECJ stated that because there is no one body that 
could rectify the disparity in salary with two different employers, a claim 
for equal pay could not be sustained.243 
An additional point should be made regarding the ECJ’s opinion in 
Allonby that certainly reflects the current condition for part-time workers.  
The ECJ stated that part-time professors are still “workers” within the 
confines of EU law, even if they are not forced to undertake an offered 
assignment.244 
Although provided with the opportunity to significantly broaden the 
scope of the equal pay for equal work principle to apply across employers, 
the ECJ refused to do so in Lawrence v. Regent Office Care Ltd.245  The 
facts of Lawrence certainly provide insight for those involved, either as 
employers, government agencies, and/or associated workers, with the 
process of outsourcing.  In Lawrence, the plaintiffs were workers that, at 
one time, were directly employed by a U.K. government agency as cleaners 
and caterers in various schools, but later became employees of a private 
sector agency charged with the same responsibilities, but the latter 
employer acquired those duties through outsourcing.246  However, while 
still employed as cleaners and caterers for the local government agency, the 
plaintiffs had successfully shown evidence of sex discrimination in regard 
to remuneration as the local government agency accepted the results of a 
job evaluation study showing the work of cleaners and caterers to be of 
equal value in comparison to those working in gardening, refuse collection, 
and sewage treatment, most of whom were men, but also worked for the 
same local government agency.247  As the result of the proof of sex 
discrimination pursuant to the equal pay for equal work principle, the wages 
of the cleaners and caterers were raised to that of the workers engaged in 
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gardening, refuse collection, and sewage treatment.248  Following the 
outsourcing of cleaning and catering services to a private firm, the local 
government agency employees were hired by the private firm at lower wage 
rates.249  Those working for the private firm filed an action for sex 
discrimination in regard to the equal pay for equal work principle with a 
British administrative court.250  The employees claimed that Article 157 (ex 
141, 119) applies to the condition whereby a private sector employer hires 
workers whose labor has been earlier determined to be of equal value to 
another set of workers directly employed by the same local government 
agency that awards the contract to the private sector employer.251 
The ECJ stated that the equal pay for equal work principle is directly 
effective to member-states and also applies to both government employers 
and private sector employers so that employees can rely on these 
protections regardless of their employer.252  However, there were three 
realities cited by the ECJ that made this case different.  These include that 
the employees being compared for equal work for equal pay purposes had 
different employers, that the work performed by the cleaning and catering 
employees was the same under the private sector employer as it was for the 
local government agency, and that there was a continuation of the belief 
that the work performed by the cleaners, caterers, gardeners, refuse 
collectors, and sewage treatment workers was of equal value.253  
Regardless, the ECJ held that the scope of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) only 
applied to employees working for the same employer, and thus, the 
plaintiffs could not rely on Article 157 (ex 141, 119) for relief because the 
remuneration did not come from a single source; thus, no one organization 
could remedy the disparity in pay despite the recognition that the parties are 
performing work of equal value.254 
H.  CRITERIA FOR COMPENSATION 
One of the leading cases on the subject of equal pay for equal work and 
involving Directive 75/117 and Article 157 (ex 141, 119) is UCCE v. 
Danfoss.255  In Danfoss, a labor organization brought a claim against an 
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employers’ organization arguing the practice of using mobility, training, 
and seniority as criteria for pay supplements that led men to be paid on 
average more than women violated Directive 75/117.256  According to the 
labor organization, because of the criteria for pay supplements, men on 
average made 6.85% more than women and this reality was evidence of sex 
discrimination.257 
One of the key issues arising in the dispute between the parties in 
Danfoss was transparency in that, according to the ECJ, Directive 75/117 
requires that when a remuneration practice is not transparent to the workers, 
the employer has the burden of proof to show that the practice is not the 
cause of the disparity in pay between men and women.258  More specific to 
the case at bar, the ECJ acknowledged that much of what supported the 
employees’ action against the employers was the fact that a woman could 
not know how the system of supplemental pay criteria is used to increase a 
worker’s overall salary.259  Instead, women would only know the total 
amount of supplemented pay and the workers in each wage group are 
unable to compare the way in which the criteria were applied, but instead 
can only compare the total amounts of remuneration.260  Thus, given this 
lack of transparency, female workers are without a mechanism for which to 
enforce the equal pay for equal work doctrine.261  The ECJ contended that 
Directive 75/117 requires member-states to provide a legal forum for 
litigants who believe their rights have been violated under the equal pay for 
equal work doctrine.262  Additionally, as part of that legal process, the 
employer must proffer evidence as to how and why the remuneration 
practice, here the criteria used for pay supplements, does not violate the 
equal pay for equal work standard, and thus also making the remuneration 
system transparent.263 
Determining whether the individual criteria violate the equal pay for 
equal doctrine was the second issue addressed by the ECJ in Danfoss.  The 
ECJ stated that each criterion constituting the supplemental pay system 
would have to be considered separately.264  On the use of “mobility” as a 
supplemental pay criterion, the employer can only use such a criterion if the 
 
256.  Id. ¶¶ 1-4. 
257.  Id. ¶¶ 2-4. 
258.  Id. ¶ 11. 
259.  Id. ¶ 10. 
260.  Id. 
261.  Union of Commercial and Clerical Workers, E.C.R. 3199, ¶ 13. 
262.  Id. ¶¶ 14, 16. 
263.  Id. ¶¶ 15, 16. 
264.  Id. ¶ 18. 
         
446 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92: 415 
reward is for the ability to work variable hours, at various locations, and the 
ability to adapt to different situations.265  In contrast, an employer cannot 
use the mobility criterion if it is used to judge the quality of work.266  The 
ECJ espoused some concern that employers may judge work by women as 
simply inferior because the work was done by a woman.267  Training can be 
used as a supplemental pay criterion, so long as the training is an important 
part of improving the performance of the employee.268  According to the 
ECJ, training, or a lack thereof, may be a greater problem for women due to 
the inability to take advantage of training opportunities.269  Lastly, the 
employer can reward employees based on length of service to the 
employer.270  The ECJ also held that, when challenged with evidence that 
male workers are paid more than female workers in positions of equal 
value, an employer must justify the use of mobility and training as 
supplemental pay criteria, but need not justify the use of supplemental pay 
for length of service.271  The employer need not justify the use of length of 
service as a supplemental pay criterion even if there is evidence that women 
do not have longevity levels equal to men due to frequent interruptions in 
their careers.272 
In Cadman v. United Kingdom, the ECJ set forth several 
pronouncements about the use of length of service criterion an employer 
may use to determine pay for its employees.273  First, while citing 
precedent, the ECJ stated that the principle of equal pay requires the 
elimination of all sex discrimination regarding all forms of remuneration 
whereby the equal value has attached to similar work.274  Second, Article 
157 (ex 141, 119) should be interpreted to require the employer to prove 
that its remuneration practices are justified by objective factors unrelated to 
sex discrimination when evidence of discrimination exists.275  Third, any 
means used by the employer to achieve its legitimate objectives must be 
appropriate and necessary.276  Equally important are two provisions of EU 
law.  Directive 97/80 states that the principle of equal pay for equal work 
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also applies to cases of indirect discrimination by an employer, and thus, 
even apparently neutral employer policies on remuneration could illegally 
favor one gender over another.277  As well, the same Directive places the 
burden of proof on the employer in cases involving sex discrimination.278  
The Directive also mandates that member-states allow those believing they 
have been disadvantaged by an employer’s remuneration practices, as the 
result of gender discrimination, to seek judicial review.279 
More specific to the use of longevity as a means to compensate 
workers, the ECJ stated that the use of rewarding experience on the job, 
allows the worker in question to perform his or her duties at a high level 
and also because the benefit of experience is the result of longevity, an 
employer is free to use such a means to financially reward workers.280  
Furthermore, according to the ECJ, when the use of longevity as a 
remuneration criterion is only designed to reward workers for obtaining 
experience, the employer need not justify the use of longevity.281  This is 
true even if a worker, feeling disadvantaged by the system, provides 
evidence of disparities in pay between men and women in regard to the 
principle of equal work for equal pay when an employee could show that he 
or she has obtained the experience necessary to reach the work level of a 
person with many years of experience.282 
The facts of Cadman are compelling.  Ms. Cadman worked for the 
same employer for many years under a traditional incremental system that 
included a provision for longevity in order to pay workers after several 
years of service.283  In 1992, the employer moved to a performance system 
which adjusted the annual increment to reflect an employee’s individual 
performance and all high performing employees to reach the top of the pay 
scale more quickly.284  Ms. Cadman filed a complaint with the British 
government after she was able to show that four men earned more than she 
did for the same level of work, but who had been employed by the same 
employer for longer periods of time.285  The British Court of Appeal, which 
received the case after an administrative court had entertained it, reasoned 
that a systematic prejudice existed in using longevity as a remuneration 
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criterion because, in the U.K. and throughout the EU, the average length of 
service to an employer for women is shorter than for men.286  The ECJ 
contended that an employer need only justify the use of longevity as a 
remuneration criterion when the employee provides evidence of a disparate 
impact between men and women due to the use of the remuneration system 
and there are serious doubts as to whether the objective of rewarding 
experience is an appropriate objective.287 
I. SICK LEAVE BENEFITS 
Member-state legislation that provides for sick leave pay yet has the 
effect of adversely impacting women, violates Article 157 (ex 141, 119).288  
In Rinner-Kuhn v. FWW, the ECJ found fault with a German law that 
required employers to pay wages for up to six weeks while a worker was 
involuntarily on sick leave, however, employment contract required the 
employee to work more than ten hours per week or more than forty-five 
hours per month, and those that normally worked fewer hours were 
excluded from the sick leave wage benefit.289  The plaintiff, a female who 
worked roughly ten hours per week, was denied benefits by her employer 
pursuant to the German legislation.290  According to the ECJ, the 
continuation of pay while an employee is on sick leave is included within 
the definition of pay as it pertains to Article 157’s guarantee that men and 
women must be paid equally for equal work.291  Although facially neutral in 
regard to gender, the ECJ found that once the German law made a 
distinction between two categories of workers, those working more than ten 
hours per week and those working less than ten hours per week, under 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119), the German law would have to face scrutiny 
because the sick leave benefit was considered a form of pay.292 
Although the German law did not expressly separate men from women 
in regard to the sick leave compensation benefit, the ECJ held so long as the 
percentage of women that fall into the category of workers not receiving the 
benefit is greater than the percentage of men who would benefit, the spirit 
of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) is violated.293  The ECJ was firm in holding 
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that only when such a member-state law is justified by objective factors not 
related to sex discrimination could it be upheld in the face of Article 157 
(ex 141, 119).294  For the legislation to be upheld, the member-state would 
have to show that the means chosen meet a necessary aim of its social 
policy and that the suitable and requisite for attaining that aim; and in this 
case, if the member-state could substantiate that, then the mere difference in 
impact between female and male workers would not be disastrous.295  
However, it is for the national courts to decide whether a member-state’s 
law impacts men and women workers differently, and whether that 
difference is objectively tolerable or amounts to sex discrimination.296 
J. GENDER REASSIGNMENT 
In Richards v. Secretary of State for Work & Pensions, the ECJ held 
that Directive 79/7/EEC prohibits a member-state from denying a person 
who has undergone gender reassignment surgery the benefits that would 
otherwise apply to that person associated with his or her new gender 
identity.297  More specifically, the ECJ found a U.K. decision to deny a 
potential pensioner, Ms. Richards, a government pension because she had 
not reached the retirement age associated with her birth gender (male) to be 
interpreted as precluding legislation.298  In 2002, Ms. Richards, born as a 
male in 1942, petitioned the U.K. government for a pension after engaging 
in gender reassignment surgery in 2001.299  However, the U.K. government 
refused to approve the application for a pension contending that Ms. 
Richards had to wait until she turned sixty-five.300  Somewhat confusingly, 
the U.K. Gender Recognition Act allowed for a citizen to receive a gender 
recognition certificate identifying the new gender when a citizen had 
suffered from gender dysphoria and had acquired the new gender (via 
surgical procedure) two years from the date of application for the 
certificate.301 
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The ECJ began its opinion by stating that it is the province of each 
member-state to determine when a person has changed his or her gender.302  
However, the ECJ also stated that the scope of Directive 79/7 is not only 
confined to matters of discrimination based on male or female gender, but 
also applies to the rights of equal treatment in regard to gender 
reassignment.303  Moreover, the ECJ contended that the Directive seeks to 
protect the full embodiment of social security rights and that the right not to 
be discriminated against on grounds of sex is a fundamental human right 
under EU law, and it is the ECJ’s role to ensure those rights.304  The ECJ 
rejected the U.K.’s argument, at least in regard to relativity to the facts of 
the case, that there was a need to have different pension eligibility ages for 
men and women.305  The ECJ stated that EU law and its own case law 
require, when applicable, that member-states comply with EU statutory and 
case law despite the fact that both allow member-states to develop their 
social security systems.306  According to the ECJ, although member-states 
could have different pension eligibility ages within their social security 
systems, member-states are not allowed to derogate from the protections 
afforded those who wish to undergo a gender reassignment, and once that 
occurs, a member-state cannot discriminate on the basis of gender 
reassignment.307 
K.  LIFE PARTNERSHIPS 
Showing progression toward the equality of marriage and a life 
partnership between two people of the same gender, in Maruko v. Germany, 
the ECJ held that once a member-state enacts legislation equating the two 
forms of union, it must equally award survivor’s benefits.308  The case arose 
when Mr. Maruko’s life partner died and he was denied a survivor’s 
pension from the pension fund associated with his life partner’s 
employment.309  At the time, German law recognized same-sex life 
partnerships and set guidelines for obtaining such a recognition, which 
included a requirement that the life partners agree to support and care for 
each other and commit to a lifetime union, contribute to common needs of 
the partnership through employment and property, and also required mutual 
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family recognition.310  German law also provided for equality of pension 
rights for survivors of marriages and life partnerships, specifically 
identified equality between a spouse and a life partner, and recognized, on 
equality grounds, the ending of a life partnership and a divorce.311 
The employment of Mr. Maruko’s life partner, as a theatre worker, 
mandated he be part of a collective bargaining agreement that afforded 
pension benefits and associated survivor rights for married people, but 
failed to recognize such pension and survivor rights for life partners.312  The 
pension fund argued that it was not entitled to provide a survivor’s benefit 
to Mr. Maruko because such a benefit should not be regarded as “pay” 
within the confines of Directive 2000/78, which mirrors the language of 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119), requiring equality in pay.313  The pension fund 
also stated that because it is regulated by public law, and thus, is outside the 
scope of Directive 2000/78 and Article 157 (ex 141, 119), as both laws 
exclude state pension schemes that are created by statute, and the pension 
system in question is not linked directly to specific employment but instead 
was created based on social policy grounds.314 
According to the ECJ, the survivor’s benefit at issue was within the 
scope of “pay” for purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), which includes 
not only wages, salaries, and other forms of consideration, but also includes 
benefits that are paid at the conclusion of an employment relationship.315  
Furthermore, the ECJ also stated that the method by which a survivor’s 
pension is calculated falls within the anti-discrimination provisions of 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119).316  Most importantly, the ECJ found the theatre’s 
pension fund to be outside of the exclusions of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) 
and Directive 2000/78 because the workers were subject to a collective 
bargaining agreement that was exclusive to only theatre workers, which 
qualified as a specific category of workers and such workers must be part of 
the collective bargaining profession to gain the benefits.317 
On the more specific question of equality, the ECJ found that it was 
Germany’s clear intent to treat same-sex life partnerships on the same level 
as traditional marriages.318  Once that equality is legislated, Article 157 (ex 
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141, 119) and Directive 2000/78 prohibit this form of direct discrimination 
occurring when two groups of people, in comparable circumstances, are 
treated in a way whereby one of the groups is handled less favorably than 
the other.319 
L.  MATERNITY LEAVE 
According to the ECJ in Abdoulaye v. Renault, the provisions for 
financial remuneration during maternity leave, as a lump sum and the 
continuation of paid salary, constitute pay pursuant to Article 157 (ex 143, 
119) and Directive 75/117.320  Here, the plaintiffs were male employees 
contending that the labor agreement between the workers and the employer 
(Renault) provided for a lump sum to be paid to a female worker who 
would also receive her traditional salary and social security contributions.321  
However, if a male or female worker were to adopt a child, that worker 
would only receive a lump sum.322  Interestingly enough, the male plaintiffs 
limited their complaint, contending that Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and 
Directive 75/117 were violated, to only the financial compensation 
components of the lump sum and the continued salary and social security 
components, and did not take issue with the labor agreement’s provision 
that only women can take maternity leave.323 
The ECJ reminded readers that Article 157 (ex 141, 119) applied to all 
consideration that workers would receive, directly or indirectly, from their 
employers.324  The ECJ added that the TFEU applied to cases even when 
labor agreements and/or statutory provisions require payment to workers 
(such as in the case of paid maternity leave) when workers are not 
performing their duties.325  The ECJ next stated that for a claim of equal pay 
for equal work to be successful, the male and female workers must be in 
comparable positions.326  The employer, Renault, posited several reasons as 
to why men and women workers are not comparable in regard to maternity 
leave, including that women on maternity leave are not eligible for 
promotion, the maternity leave period does not count toward longevity, 
female workers are not eligible for performance-related salary increases, 
and the returning female worker is not up to speed regarding technological 
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advances in the workplace.327  In the end, the ECJ did not find that the 
payment of salary and social security contributions, as well as a lump sum, 
to only female workers while on maternity leave infringed upon Article 157 
(ex 141, 119) because these payments are designed to compensate for the 
occupational disadvantages associated with maternity leave.328 
The difference between military leave, on the one hand, and parental 
and maternity leave, on the other hand, and whether the participants in those 
forms of leave are to be considered comparable pursuant to Article 157 (ex 
141, 119) and Directive 75/117 in regard to the equal pay for equal work 
principle were the subject matter in Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund v. 
Wirtschaftskammer Osterreich.329  Here, the ECJ held that military service, 
although almost exclusively the province of men, and parental and 
maternity leave, which is almost exclusively engaged in by women, are not 
comparable activities for the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and 
Directive 75/117.330 
As is typical in Europe, the litigants were an employees’ labor 
organization (the Gewerkschaftsbund) and an employers’ organization (the 
Wirtschaftskammer Osterreich).331  The former argued that for purposes of 
calculating the length of service period for an employer, the longer of which 
makes a termination payment larger, should include the period by which an 
employee takes parental leave, as is the case when a person in military (or 
civilian) service, when absent, is entitled to have that time period included 
within the length of service period for the purposes of calculating a 
termination payment.332  The employees’ labor organization believed that 
the discrepancy in treatment between the two forms of leave violated 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119)  because 98.253% of those on parental leave are 
women, whereas only 1.747% are men, while virtually all military 
personnel are men, and thus, the Austrian system resulted in a form of 
indirect discrimination.333  In contrast to the position taken by the 
employees’ labor organization, the employers’ organization contended that 
those in military service and those taking parental leave are not comparable 
for the purposes of the equal pay for equal work doctrine, because parents 
take parental leave voluntarily which is unrelated to the employer’s 
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conduct, and thus, length of service in cases of parental leave should not be 
counted in regard to a termination payment.334  Furthermore, the employers’ 
organization argued there was no discrimination against women because 
Austrian law creates a very favorable condition for those who wish to take 
parental leave in that the employee cannot be dismissed from his or her 
position.335 
Austrian law, at the time of the case at bar, required a termination 
payment under certain conditions and such payment was, in part, based on 
the length of service to the employer.336  However, pregnant women were 
not permitted to work during the last eight weeks of a pregnancy, during the 
eight weeks after a traditional birth, if, at any time, the continuation of work 
would endanger the life of the mother or child, or for twelve weeks after a 
premature or caesarean birth.337  Furthermore, an employee can electively 
take up to two years off from work to care for a child until the child reaches 
two years of age.338  At no time can the period for which the employee was 
removed from work be counted toward the length of service criterion for a 
termination payment, regardless of when or why the employee was on 
parental leave.339  Austrian law also set the requirements for military 
service which included both compulsory service for men, and elective 
service for women, which can be voluntarily extended by the military 
personnel, but in all cases, the time spent in the military would count for 
length of service for a termination payment.340 
First, the ECJ stated that a termination payment was within the scope 
of the term “pay” in Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and any unequal treatment in 
regard to termination payments would be analyzed pursuant to that 
Article.341  On the subject of comparability between workers on military 
leave and those on parental leave, the ECJ found that these two sets of 
workers were not comparable in regard to Article 157 (ex 141, 119), 
because the purposes of the two forms of leave were different.342  
Specifically, parental leave is voluntary and to care for a newborn, while 
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military leave is involuntary and part of a larger civic obligation.343  The 
ECJ also commented that its jurisprudence allowed member-states to limit 
compulsory military service to men.344  The ECJ made clear that the 
suspension of employment for the greater interest of the member-state’s 
defense could allow for different treatment in contrast to the suspension of 
employment to take care of family interests.345 
In a split decision on the scope and limitations of maternity leave, the 
ECJ held that Article 157 (ex 143, 119) and Directive 75/117 do not require 
that women on maternity leave receive the same salary they received while 
engaged in full-time work, but that women on maternity leave should 
receive any pay increases granted to other workers while they are on 
maternity leave.346  In Gillespie v. Northern Ireland Health and Social 
Services Boards, the ECJ also stated that, although women on maternity 
leave are not guaranteed the same salary as when they were working, they 
should not be paid so low as to undermine maternity leave’s purpose, and 
any reviewing court assigned to determine the appropriate value of 
maternity leave must take into account the length of the maternity leave and 
other forms of social protection afforded by a member-state’s national 
law.347  In this case, the ECJ heard a complaint by the plaintiffs who were 
paid less than the amount they would have been paid while engaged in full-
time work, and held that such treatment violated Article 157 (ex 141, 119), 
Directive 75/117, and Directive 76/207.348  The ECJ found that the amount 
plaintiffs were paid on maternity leave, a full salary for the first four weeks, 
nine-tenths of the salary for the two weeks thereafter, and one-half of the 
salary for the final twelve weeks, was not below the level that would 
undermine the purpose of maternity leave.349  Interestingly enough, the 
amount paid to the plaintiffs was pursuant to a collective bargaining 
agreement which set the maternity leave pay higher than the statutory pay 
rate of nine-tenths for the first six weeks and a flat-rate allowance for the 
remainder of the maternity leave period.350 
After restating the premise that Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and Directive 
75/117 require the elimination of all discrimination that would interfere 
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with the equal pay for equal work doctrine espoused in both laws, the ECJ 
stated that income guaranteed in a collective bargaining agreement between 
employees and an employer, which includes provisions for maternity leave, 
is within the scope of the term “pay.”351 
In Griesmar v. France, a predecessor to Leone v. France, the ECJ held 
that a French law provided service credits associated with the national 
pension system for female civil service workers for (1) each natural child 
with established paternity, (2) each adopted child, and (3) each child falling 
into a third category, so long as the child has been raised by the mother for 
at least nine years prior to the child’s twenty-first birthday, including (a) 
children from an earlier marriage, (b) children delegated of parental 
authority in the name of the female civil servant or her husband, (c) children 
placed in the guardianship of the female civil servant or her husband, and 
(d) foster children placed with the female civil servant or her husband, to be 
in violation of the Agreement on Social Policy which, according to the ECJ, 
reproduces the rules set forth in Article 157 (ex 141, 119).352  The 
Agreement on Social Policy went into effect on the day the Treaty of 
Amsterdam went into force of which the latter reproduced and modified 
Article 119 (now Article 157).353 
In Griesmar, the plaintiff, a male civil servant and father of three 
children was awarded a pension by the French government, yet the pension 
granted did not take into consideration the service credits which would have 
been awarded to a female civil servant in similar circumstances regarding 
parenthood.354  The father argued that his status as a father is derived from 
the reality that he has children, just as a woman’s status as a mother is 
derived, and that the French pension law in question provides female civil 
service workers with service credits on the sole basis of motherhood 
without any proof that she raised the children, either naturally born or 
adopted.355  Furthermore, attested the father, the service credits are not 
designed to offset any occupational disadvantages the female civil service 
worker would encounter because the grant of service credits is not attached 
to any requirement of maternity leave and she earns these service credits 
even if she had lost the status of civil servant or was not a civil servant at 
the time of the birth or adoption.356  The French government stated that the 
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service credits are awarded to address any occupational or career challenges 
female civil service workers who have had children would face due to the 
reality that they are the predominant caretakers of children, regardless of 
whether they have taken off time from their careers to do so.357  The ECJ, 
however, noted that the French pension law did not allow male civil service 
workers to earn the service credits, although they may have proof to 
establish that they have been chiefly responsible for raising their birthed or 
adopted children; thus, the French pension law created a difference on 
gender grounds.358 
The ECJ believed that the Agreement on Social Policy allowed 
member-state governments to employ measures that would remove or 
mitigate the actual instances of inequality facing women.359  Specifically, 
on the question as to whether this difference in treatment grounds was 
tolerable under Article 157 and the Agreement on Social Policy, the ECJ 
found that the service credits provision benefitting only female civil service 
workers would not offset the obstacles they faced.360 
The ECJ did not find a link between the service credits awarded by the 
French pension system, generally, and the application of those credits to 
female civil service workers due to any career challenges they face because 
the service credits were not linked to maternity leave or adoption leave and 
thus female workers who did not take maternity leave did not face 
occupational challenges.361  Although the ECJ found that the sole reason for 
awarding the service credits was due to the belief that female civil service 
workers raised the children they birthed or adopted, the legislative history 
of the French pension law on that point indicated that the purpose of the 
service credits was actually to make it easier for female civil service 
workers to leave work and remain at home to raise their children.362 
One of the most significant points in Griesmar was the ECJ’s comment 
on the reach of Article 157 (ex 141, 119).  The ECJ first stated the 
traditional parameters of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), that member-states 
which develop pension systems based on social policy, or concerns of 
governmental organization, ethics, and/or budgetary issues, and do not 
address a specific category of workers, are free to craft those pensions 
systems without fear of infringing Article 157 (ex 141, 119).363  However, 
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pursuant to the facts of the Griesmar case, the ECJ found that because civil 
servants would constitute a specific category of workers, member-states that 
create pension schemes to benefit those workers must follow the equal pay 
requirement of Article 157.364 
In Leone v. Gardes des Sceaux, the ECJ was asked to comment on 
whether a French law that provided for early retirement and an immediate 
pension for a civil servant with (1) either three children or a (2) child older 
than one year old, with a disability of 80% or greater, so long as the civil 
servant/parent was able to show that he or she took a career break of at least 
two continuous months in the form of (1) maternity leave, (2) adoption 
leave, (3) paternity leave, (4) parental care leave, or (5) parental leave 
violated Article 157 (ex 141, 119).365  In addition to the aforementioned 
conditions, French law required the civil servant to have taken the career 
breaks just before the birth or adoption and the have ended the leave just 
after the birth or adoption.366  Furthermore, the child must have been raised 
by the civil servant for at least nine years with these breaks taking place 
before the child’s sixteenth birthday or before the age at which they ceased 
to be dependent.367  In addition to the right to an early retirement with an 
immediate pension, the French law provided to the civil servant/parent a 
four-trimester service credit.368  In Leone, the plaintiff was a male civil 
servant/parent with three children who did not take career breaks during the 
periods surrounding the birth of his children and was, thus, denied an early 
retirement with an immediate pension by the French government.369 
The ECJ acknowledged that the provisions of French law were neutral 
in relation to the gender of the civil servant, yet, also acknowledged that the 
impact of the French legislation would benefit a much higher proportion of 
women than men.370  The French government, however, defended its policy 
as a means to compensate for the career-related disadvantages of birthing 
and/or adopting a new child.371  According to the ECJ, for the French law to 
sustain a challenge in the face of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), the French 
government would be required to show that it maintained a legitimate 
policy aim through objective factors unrelated to gender and that the social 
policy supporting the aim genuinely reflects the concern to attain that 
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aim.372  The French government would also be required to show that the 
social policy is pursued in a consistent and systematic manner in regard to 
the legitimate policy aim.373 
Interestingly, the ECJ cast doubt on whether the social policy, allowing 
early retirement with an immediate pension for a civil servant maintaining 
the aforementioned responsibilities connected to child rearing, would 
actually compensate for career-related disadvantages arising from a career 
break.374  The ECJ also mentioned that the French government had not 
established how this social policy would meet its objectives.375  
Specifically, the ECJ found three problems with the French government’s 
social policy that would purportedly meet its aim.  First, the ECJ seemed 
unsure as to why the early retirement with an immediate pension should be 
associated with having both a career break of two months and the fact that 
the children must be raised by the civil servant for at least nine years.376  
Second, it was unclear why there would be a difference in eligibility based 
on whether the civil servant had a child with a disability of 80%.377  Third, 
the ECJ believed there is no difference in the disadvantages associated with 
a career break based on whether the civil servant had one or several 
children.378 
In an interesting twist, however, the ECJ stated that Article 157 (ex 
141, 119) did not prohibit a member-state from creating a social policy that 
creates specific advantages to make it easier for the underrepresented 
gender to participate in a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for 
disadvantages that the underrepresented gender may face in his or her 
professional career.379  The ECJ saw the French law in question, which 
created a right to early retirement with an immediate pension and service 
credit granted for the career breaks that a civil servant/parent takes, as a 
means to craft full equality between men and women in the workplace.380 
M. PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS 
The ECJ addressed the problem of whether the equal pay for equal 
work doctrine, pursuant to Article 157 (ex 143, 119), is violated when 
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professionals of different academic backgrounds and different qualifications 
perform the same work-related duties, yet one group is paid a higher salary 
than another and the lower paid group is comprised of a higher number of 
women.381  In the Staff Committee v. Health Fund case, the foundation of 
the argument put forth by the Staff Committee largely rested on statistics 
showing that Health Fund employed, within its clinic, twelve 
psychotherapists including six doctors and six psychologists, and within 
those two subsets, five doctors were men and five psychologists were 
women.382  Health Fund also employed thirty-four psychotherapists within 
its social insurance institutions, twenty-four of which were psychologists 
and ten of which were doctors.383  Yet, only eighteen of those psychologists 
were women and only two women were doctors.384  However, regardless of 
whether the employee was a doctor or a psychologist, both sets of 
professionals performed duties as psychotherapists, but the doctors were 
paid more than the psychologists in accordance with a collective bargaining 
agreement between the employees and the employer.385  The Staff 
Committee argued that psychologists should be placed within the same 
salary band as doctors, and without Health Fund doing so, Article 157 (ex 
141, 119) and Directive 75/117 are violated.386 
According to the ECJ, the equal pay for equal work doctrine requires 
that employees be paid equally in regard to piece rates when the same unit 
of measurement is used and that, as a rule, equal pay for work at time rates 
applies when employees are performing the same job.387  The Staff 
Committee contended that the ECJ should hold that doctors and 
psychologists who perform the same work as psychotherapists should be 
compensated at the same rate because, in a prior case, the ECJ held that 
categories of employees with different professions and qualifications can 
perform work of equal value; therefore, that rule should apply across the 
board to cases whereby employees are performing the same work.388  In 
contrast, Health Fund suggested that two groups of employees with 
different professional qualifications, involving different obligations and 
skills, are not engaged in the same work for the purposes of the equal work 
 
381.  Case C-309/97, Angestelltenbetriebsrat der Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse v. Wiener 
Gebietskrankenkasse, 1999 E.C.R. I-02865, ¶ 9. 
382.  Id. ¶ 8. 
383.  Id. 
384.  Id. 
385.  Id. ¶¶ 1-3, 5. 
386.  Id. ¶¶ 1, 5. 
387.  Angestelltenbetriebsrat der Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse, E.C.R. I-02865, ¶ 10. 
388.  Id. ¶¶ 11-12. 
         
2017] CLOSING THE GENDER PAY GAP 461 
for equal pay doctrine.389  Although the ECJ restated its belief that Article 
157 (ex 141, 119) applied to situations whereby employees are in 
comparable situations yet exposed to different rules, the ECJ reminded the 
Staff Committee that its earlier jurisprudence only addressed the question of 
work of equal value.390  It also agreed with Health Fund that doctors and 
psychologists, even when performing the function of psychotherapist, are 
not actually engaged in the same work.391  The ECJ believed that the 
differences between doctors and psychotherapists was too great in regard to 
the knowledge and skills they draw upon and also because doctors can 
engage in many more activities, including psychotherapy, whereby 
psychologists can only engage in psychotherapy.392  It was also important to 
the ECJ that doctors and psychologists were recruited by Health Fund for 
their different backgrounds.393  Additionally, the ECJ stated that it was 
irrelevant that the fee charged to clients for psychotherapy services, 
regardless of whether those services were performed by a doctor or a 
psychologist, was the same.394  Nevertheless, the ECJ stated that reviewing 
courts in similar cases should evaluate the two subsets of workers based on 
several factors, such as the nature of the work, any associated training 
requirements, and working conditions, to determine if the equal pay for 
equal work doctrine should apply.395 
IV. THEMES DISCOVERED FROM AN EXAMINATION OF ECJ 
CASELAW ON EQUAL PAY 
The compilation of caselaw in this Article reflects several themes.  
First, any entity considering employing people in the EU should be 
concerned with the terms included in the definition of pay for the purposes 
of Article 157 (ex 141, 119).  Despite the lack of an express definition in 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119), the ECJ has espoused a wide definition of pay to 
remove the vestiges of pay discrimination that existed in the EU’s past 
employment world.  According to the ECJ, retirement contributions and 
pension plans are within the confines of pay pursuant to Article 157 (ex 
141, 119).396  In Worringham, the ECJ was deliberate to include within the 
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scope of Article 157 any form of remuneration that affected equality.397  In 
Bilka, pension plans, even voluntarily created by employment agreements 
between employers and workers, are examined through the lens of Article 
157 (ex 141, 119); however, the ECJ held that part-time workers could be 
excluded from the pension scheme if objectively justified.398  The definition 
of pay under Article 157 (ex 141, 119) also includes non-working related 
activities such as lump-sum payments for maternity leave and termination 
payments for maternity and military leave.399  More broadly, service credits 
associated with maternity leave also constitute a form of pay.400  
Additionally, employers must acknowledge the equal pay requirements of 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) when providing redundancy pay in both the 
public and private sectors.401  In-kind benefits issued to employees, even 
when the employer provides them out of choice and not due to an 
obligation, are covered by Article 157 (ex 141, 119).402  Likewise, benefits 
associated with an employee’s sick leave must adhere to the equal pay 
doctrine.403 
Despite the previously-mentioned jurisprudence on the terms included 
within the definition of pay for the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), 
there are three cases that, perhaps, best show the breadth of the equal pay 
doctrine.  In Danfoss, the ECJ held that the criteria used to determine pay 
supplements, and each criterion separately within the pay supplement 
scheme, will be scrutinized under Article 157 (ex 141, 119).404  However, 
the one criterion within a supplemental pay scheme used by an employer 
that will not be scrutinized is supplemental pay based on length of 
service.405  The ECJ’s decision in Seymour-Smith also expands the breadth 
of the equal pay doctrine as the ECJ held that a judgment, and the related 
award tied to an equal pay discrimination case, must be evaluated based on 
 
397.  Worringham, E.C.R. 0767, ¶¶ 25, 28. 
398.  Bilka, 1986 E.C.R. 1607, ¶¶ 22-23, 31. 
399.  Case C-218/98, Abdoulaye v. Renault, 1999 ECR I-05723, ¶¶ 4-5, 12; Case C-342/93, 
Gillespie v. N. Health & Soc. Servs. Boards, 1996 E.C.R. I-492, ¶ 21; Case C-220/02, Case C-
220/02, Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund Gewerkschaft v. Wirtschaftskammer Osterreich, 
2004 E.C.R. I-5907, ¶ 65. 
400.  Case C-366/99, Griesmar v. Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 
2001 E.C.R. I-09383, ¶¶ 64-65. 
401.  Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., 1990 E.C.R. I-01889, 
¶¶ 16-17, 19-20. 
402.  Case 12/81, Garland v. British Rail Eng’g Ltd., 1982 E.C.R. 0359, ¶¶ 5, 9 (“Grounds”). 
403.  Case C-171/88, Rinner-Kuhn v. FWW Spezial-Gebaeudereinigung GmbH & Co., 1989 
E.C.R. 2743, ¶ 16. 
404.  Case C-109/88, Union of Commercial and Clerical Workers v. Danish Emp’rs’ Ass’n 
ex rel Danfoss, 1989 E.C.R. 3119, ¶ 18. 
405.  Id. ¶ 24. 
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Article 157 (ex 141, 119).406  The Maruko decision will likely be most 
noteworthy for its fact pattern involving a member-state’s recognition of 
same-sex marriage, but for the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), the 
decision will be noted for the extension of the equal pay doctrine to 
survivor’s benefits.407 
Second, although the ECJ has maintained a broad conceptual definition 
of pay for the purposes of Article 157 (ex 141, 119), there does exist some 
discretion for member-states and employers.408  This discretion exists 
despite the ECJ’s declaration in Barber that every national court must work 
to remove all discrimination that contradicts the tenets of the equal pay 
doctrine and despite the ECJ’s holding in Seymour-Smith, whereby 
employers may be asked to objectively justify their decisions in creating 
remuneration systems and rhetorically asked whether there is a better 
method to create these systems without the effect of disadvantaging female 
workers.409  Member-states have the discretion to craft a retirement system 
based on its own social and employment policies and are free to do so long 
as the social policy is not tied to discrimination.410  In fact, a pension 
system can be developed around a member-state’s social policy, if the 
social policy is not based solely on the employer-employee relationship.411  
For example, the ECJ held in Moreno that a retirement system can be based 
on age and years of service, in accordance with Article 157 (ex 141, 119), 
so long as the system is based on that member-state’s social policy, the 
member-state’s organization, the member-state’s budgetary concerns, and 
does not single out one category of worker.412  Relatedly, and somewhat 
remarkably, member-states are still allowed to maintain different retirement 
ages for each gender.413  Perhaps the best example of an allowable member-
state social policy that passed Article 157 (ex 141, 119) muster is the ECJ’s 
decision in Leone whereby the ECJ held that a member-state can implement 
an early retirement system to assist an underrepresented group (such as 
female workers) so long as it is clear that the member-state is attempting to 
 
406.  Case C-167/97, Regina v. Seymour-Smith, 1999 E.C.R I-00623, ¶¶ 28-29, 36. 
407.  Case C-267/06, Maruko v. German Theatre Pension Inst., 2008 E.C.R. I-1757, ¶¶ 42-
44, 73. 
408.  Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., 1990 E.C.R. I-01889, 
¶¶ 38-39; Regina, E.C.R. I-00623, ¶¶ 68, 70-72. 
409.  Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., 1990 E.C.R. I-01889, 
¶¶ 38-39; Regina, E.C.R. I-00623, ¶¶ 68, 70-72. 
410.  Regina, 1999 E.C.R. I-00623, ¶¶ 72, 74-75. 
411.  Case C-385/11, Moreno v. Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Soc., 2012 E.C.R. 00000, 
¶¶ 22-25. 
412.  Id. ¶¶ 23-25. 
413.  Case C-423/04, Richards v. Sec’y of State for Work &Pensions, 2006 E.C.R. I-3602, 
¶¶ 34-35, 38 (“Grounds”). 
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close the gender gap or presumably, any gap, between an overrepresented 
and underrepresented group.414 
As previously stated, the Maruko case will have a profound effect in 
the future based on its fact pattern involving same-sex relationships, but it 
also reflects a member-state’s discretion in determining which relationships 
it equates to a traditional marriage.  However, once that determination is 
made and a non-traditional relationship is equated to a traditional 
relationship, the discretion is removed and a member-state must apply the 
tenets of the equal pay doctrine.415  Relatedly, the discretion associated with 
equality of relationships, once made, cannot be trumped by a collective 
bargaining agreement and such an agreement must acknowledge the 
member-state’s extension of equality.416  In the ECJ’s Richards decision, a 
case with similar progressive issues involved, a member-state was granted 
the discretion to determine when a person’s gender has changed, legally.417  
In Rinner-Kuhn, a case that is likely reflective of the broadest swath of 
member-state discretion, the ECJ stated that in equal pay cases the member-
state’s national courts can determine whether genders are treated differently 
based on the facts of a case and also, after having determined if inequality 
has occurred, whether that difference in treatment is tolerable.418  A 
member-state also has the ability to create differences in salary and benefits 
for public servants.419 
There are limits on the discretion of both member-states as well as 
employers.  Employers cannot use professional qualifications as the sole 
reason for differences in salaries if two groups of workers are performing 
the same work or work of equal value, even if one group has greater 
professional qualifications than the other.420  The most significant limitation 
on a member-state’s discretion pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119) is a 
general, but broad stroke, prohibition against categorically treating workers 
differently.421 
 
414.  Case C-173/13, Leone v. Garde des Sceaux, 2014 E.C.R. 00000, ¶ 100 (“Grounds”). 
415.  Case C-267/06, Maruko v. German Theatre Pension Inst., 2008 E.C.R. I-1757, ¶¶ 66-
67, 71-73. 
416.  Id. ¶¶ 49-53. 
417.  Richards, E.C.R. I-3602, ¶ 21. 
418.  Case C-171/88, Rinner-Kuhn v. FWW Spezial-Gebaeudereinigung GmbH & Co., 1989 
E.C.R. 2743, ¶ 15. 
419.  Cases C-124/11, C 125/11, and C 143/11, Germany v. Dittrich, 2012 E.C.R. 00000, ¶ 
41. 
420.  Case C-309/97, Angestelltenbetriebsrat der Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse v. Wiener 
Gebietskrankenkasse, 1999 E.C.R. I-02865, ¶¶ 12, 16, 20. 
421.  Case C-366/99, Griesmar v. Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, 
2001 E.C.R. I-09383, ¶¶ 30-31, 35. 
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The third major theme espoused in the caselaw is that, although the 
great majority of forms of remuneration and compensation during 
employment and after employment are within the scope of Article 157 (ex 
141, 119), there is a noticeable disconnect between what is covered by 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and what member-states and employers are 
obligated to do under Article 157 (ex 141, 119).  Perhaps the best example 
of this reality is the ECJ’s decision in Barber, whereby the ECJ held that 
firms, as employers, are not permitted to have different retirement ages for 
men and women even if the member-state government in which they 
operate maintains different ages for retirement.422  Regardless of any 
disconnect, member-states or employers attempting to treat male and female 
employees differently will likely have the burden to show that Article 157 
(ex 141, 119) is not violated.423  Relatedly, employers should know that 
regardless of whether they operate in the public or private sector, Article 
157’s equal pay requirement applies.424 
There are two rules that provide the greatest disconnect between what 
is and what is not scrutinized by Article 157 (ex 141, 119).  First, the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence in both Danfoss and Cadman, stating that length of service 
criterion for any form of remuneration is immune from Article 157’s 
scrutiny even if there is evidence of a discriminatory impact, seems to be a 
puzzling separation.425  The decision in Cadman helps close the separation 
a bit between what is and what is not scrutinized by Article 157 (ex 141, 
119) in that the ECJ stated that an employer does not have to defend its use 
of a length of service provision in a remuneration scheme, so long as the 
length of service provision is only for the purposes of acquiring and 
rewarding experience.426  Taken together, however, the Danfoss and 
Cadman decisions do not help close the noticeable gap in experience 
maintained by the men and women mentioned in several cases and included 
in this Article.  The Cadman decision also widens the gap between what is 
and what is not permitted by Article 157 (ex 141, 119) in that it allows 
employers to change the criteria used to determine remuneration even when 
an employee has already begun employment.427 
 
422.  Case C-262/88, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance Grp., 1990 E.C.R. I-01889, 
¶ 32. 
423.  Case 96/80, Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Prods.) Ltd., 1981 E.C.R. 0911, ¶¶ 12-13, 
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424.  Barber, E.C.R. I-1944, ¶¶ 28, 29. 
425.  Case C-109/88, Union of Commercial and Clerical Workers v. Danish Emp’rs’ Ass’n 
ex rel Danfoss, 1989 E.C.R. 3119, ¶ 24; Case C-17/05, Cadman v. Health & Safety Exec., 2006 
E.C.R. I-09583, ¶ 39. 
426.  Id. ¶ 38. 
427.  Id. ¶ 13. 
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Within this same realm of confusion is the Bilka decision, whereby the 
ECJ stated that, pursuant to Article 157 (ex 141, 119), employers are 
permitted to exclude part-time workers from pension schemes, so long as 
the goal is to promote full-time work over part-time work, even if there is a 
negative impact on women (most likely in that they make up a larger 
proportion of part-time workers).428  Similarly, in the Nikoloudi decision, 
the ECJ stated that employers can pay full-time workers a higher wage than 
part-time workers, although indirect discrimination may result if there is 
evidence that a greater percentage of female workers are adversely 
affected.429  Therefore, it appears that by taking the Bilka and Nikoloudi 
decisions together, an employer may exclude part-time workers from its 
pension system and pay them less without infringing Article 157 (ex 141, 
119), so long as, in regard to pay, the percentage of women in the part-time 
ranks is not too great.  In such a case whereby a reviewing court found 
evidence of indirect discrimination, an employer need only raise the wages 
of the part-time workers, but need not move the part-time workers into the 
pension system. 
Although Article 157 (ex 141, 119) does not identify men or women as 
a group more so in need of equal pay recognition, one would believe that it 
would protect both genders, equally.  In Abdoulaye, the ECJ stated that 
employers could, without violating Article 157 (ex 141, 119), allow women 
to receive salary, social security contributions, and a lump sum while on 
maternity leave, without providing their male counterparts with the same 
benefits.430  This decision seems to contradict the holding in Gillespie, 
whereby the ECJ stated that women must receive salary increases while on 
maternity leave and that maternity leave cannot be compensated at such a 
low rate as to undermine the purpose of maternity leave.431  Relatedly, in 
OGGP, the ECJ held that, although admittedly different forms of benefits, a 
member-state can treat military service and maternity differently, even if 
the former is almost exclusively the province of men and the latter is almost 
exclusively the province of women, at least in regard to termination 
payments.432 
Two cases, Allonby and Lawrence, illustrate the most significant 
disconnect between the mission of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) and what is not 
considered equal pay discrimination.  Taken together, these cases stand for 
 
428.  Case 170/84, Bilka v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607, ¶¶ 33, 37, 43. 
429.  Case C-196/02, Nikoloudi v. O.T.E., 2005 E.C.R. I-01789, ¶¶ 38, 53. 
430.  Case C-218/98, Abdoulaye v. Renault, 1999 ECR I-05723, ¶¶ 20, 22. 
431.  Case C-342/93, Gillespie v. N. Health & Soc. Servs. Boards, 1996 E.C.R. I-492, ¶ 21. 
432.  Case C-220/02, Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund Gewerkschaft v. 
Wirtschaftskammer Osterreich, 2004 E.C.R. I-5907, ¶¶ 60-61, 65. 
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the idea that an employer can outsource employment to a subcontractor and 
indirectly pay those working for the subcontractor, who  are performing the 
same work as the employer’s previous employees performed, a lower 
amount even if there is a disparate difference between the employees still 
working for the employer and those working for the subcontractor in regard 
to gender.433  According to Lawrence, the employees working first for the 
employer, and then for the subcontractor, who engaged in the same work on 
the same physical grounds, can be paid less by the subcontractor.434 
Lastly, a note should be made concerning part-time workers and 
Article 157’s equal pay requirement.  Frankly speaking, part-time workers 
are not well protected by Article 157 (ex 141, 119).  As previously stated, 
part-time workers can be excluded from pension plans to promote the 
attraction of full-time employment.435  It is also acceptable, according to 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119), to pay part-time workers less than full-time 
workers.436  Perhaps the only source of equality for part-time workers lies 
within Directive 79/7 which requires employers not to prejudice part-time 
workers in regard to pension contributions assuming the employer allows 
the part-time workers to be part of the pension system.437 
V.  THREATS TO EQUAL PAY IN THE FUTURE IN THE EU 
As mentioned in Section I, the addition of new member-states to the 
EU has reduced the push for equal pay within the twenty-eight-member-
state bloc.438  If this continues, one of the chief threats to the equal pay for 
equal work doctrine is the expansion of the EU.  As the EU exists today, 
different cultures, social systems, and histories have created several 
variations of equality across the member-states despite the fact that Article 
157 (ex 141, 119) is directly effective in each member-state and no 
implementing legislation is needed to bind member-states to the equal pay 
for equal work doctrine.  Two questions that should be addressed in regard 
to equal pay is whether the EU will become more complacent with the 
differences across the member-states and whether the movement toward 
completely erasing the pay gap between male and female workers will be 
sidelined.  Member-state national courts were given the discretion in 
 
433.   Case C-320/00, Lawrence v. Regent Office Care Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-07325, ¶¶ 17-19.  
Case C-256/01, Allonby v. Accrington., 2004 E.C.R. I-00873, ¶ 79. 
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Rinner-Kuhn to determine whether a particular gender was being treated in 
a discriminatory fashion and whether this discrimination reached a level of 
intolerability.439  Much akin to the moral hazard associated with the ECJ’s 
decisions in Allonby and Lawrence, providing the member-state national 
courts with so much leeway in determining whether tolerable discrimination 
exists, creates too much risk that the cultures, social values, and histories of 
the various member-states will trump the intent of Article 157 (ex 141, 
119), to the point in which female (and male) workers are more easily 
discriminated against in regard to remuneration.  Such a checkerboard 
approach to equal pay could create the lack of harmony that Article 157 (ex 
141, 119) specifically, and the TFEU generally, sought to avoid.  Given EU 
citizen workers’ right to free movement under Article 45 (ex 39, 48), it is 
foreseeable that workers would move to member-states that maintain a 
greater level of equality.440  Likewise, pursuant to a firm’s right to 
establishment under Article 49 (ex 43, 52), employers would move to 
member-states that permit greater discretion in treating workers 
unequally.441  The holding in Rinner-Kuhn also seems to contradict the 
decision in Barber whereby the ECJ stated that national courts must work 
 
439.  Case C-171/88, Rinner-Kuhn v. FWW Spezial-Gebaeudereinigung GmbH & Co., 1989 
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TFEU art. 45. 
441.  Article 49 (ex 43, 52) states: 
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take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage 
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paragraph of Article 54, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the 
law of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of 
the Chapter relating to capital. 
 TFEU art. 49. 
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to remove all discrimination based on equality of pay.442  Questioning this 
rhetorically, is it possible to both command national courts to remove all 
discrimination based on equal pay, yet provide them with the discretion to 
determine whether a particular group is being treated disadvantageously and 
to what extent that disadvantage is tolerable. 
The ECJ’s decision in Allonby and Lawrence serves as a real threat to 
the expansive scope of Article 157’s equal pay requirement.  Both cases 
allow an employer to dismiss certain employees and replace them with a 
subcontractor’s workers who are engaged in the same form of work, yet the 
employer is able to reduce its labor costs by paying less to the 
subcontractor’s workers.443  In such a scenario, the funds to pay the 
subcontractor’s workers originate with the employer and pass through the 
subcontractor.  With these decisions in place, an employer has a method to 
reduce costs and a significant incentive to do so even if it is shown that the 
work being performed happens to maintain a comparatively high percentage 
of women.  As previously stated, women workers are more likely to suffer 
from layoffs.  One can only imagine the threat to various professions 
whereby women dominate the employment landscape and then an employer 
decides to subcontract.  The decision in Allonby, which specifically 
commented that Article 157 does not apply because no one employer can 
remediate the problem, could be easily reversed to prevent the moral hazard 
associated with the incentive to subcontract employees.444 
The Cadman decision is troublesome in light of the mission of Article 
157 (ex 141, 119) and likewise poses a threat to pay equality.  In several 
cases in this Article, the ECJ showed concern for female workers that might 
be disadvantaged because they are more likely to take on the 
responsibilities of home life and sacrifice time in the workplace.  However, 
the ECJ’s holdings in both Cadman and Danfoss allow an employer to craft 
a remuneration policy that benefits the employee’s length of service which 
can be maintained even if there is evidence of a discriminatory impact, so 
long as the employer is using the length of service criterion for the purpose 
of acquiring and rewarding experience.445  Thus, the ECJ has opened a 
pathway for unequal pay in that women, who are recognized as being more 
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likely to remove themselves from the workplace to care for family 
responsibilities and thus would have fewer years of service to an employer, 
would be disadvantaged in regard additional remuneration.  To be fair, the 
ECJ warned employers that a length of service criterion could not be used if 
there exists evidence that rewarding experience is not an appropriate 
objective.446  Despite this qualification, it is difficult to think of an instance 
whereby rewarding experience would not be an appropriate objective, or at 
least, whereby rewarding experience would be defensible.  It is unclear as to 
whether the ECJ’s holding in Gillespie, that salary increases extended to 
workers must also be extended to those on maternity leave, could perhaps 
make up for the lost time in regard to remuneration based on length of 
service.447 
The next threat to the equal pay doctrine consists of the inability of the 
ECJ to develop independently, or in conjunction with other EU institutions, 
a formula to determine comparable worth in regard to the three stages of 
equal pay.  A strong argument could be made that the EU legislative bodies 
should enact a Regulation, or at least a Directive, that puts into place a 
standard, based on a formula for determining comparable worth, and give 
the ECJ the responsibility for enforcing that standard.  This reality would 
remove some of the bias that might potentially exist pursuant to the ECJ’s 
decision in Rinner-Kuhn.  Related to this suggestion is the possibility that 
the EU legislative institutions and/or the ECJ develop a statistical standard 
to determine when a group has been disadvantaged enough to the point that 
Article 157 (ex 141, 119) would require a remedy.  In Seymour-Smith, the 
ECJ articulated a three-part test to determine whether a member-state’s 
policy has an unfavorable impact on women.448  First, an unfavorable 
impact must be recognized.449  Second, there must exist proper proportions 
of men and women in the general population in comparison to those men 
and women affected by the member-state’s policy.450  Third, the ECJ must 
determine whether that disparity has existed consistently over time.451  In 
this particular case, the ECJ found that a near 9% differential was not 
evidence of disadvantage at a level to violate Article 157 (ex 141, 119).452 
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To create complete equality across genders, two cases that the ECJ 
could reexamine include Richards and Abdoulaye.  These cases upheld a 
member-state’s ability to maintain different retirement ages for different 
genders and a maternity leave system that favored women over men.453  
Again, although the culture, history, and social system of each member-
state plays a role and the ECJ attempts to provide discretion where possible, 
requiring the same retirement age for men and women and making 
maternity leave more appealing to men would assist in cementing the 
concept of equal pay based on gender.  The author of this Article, however, 
is cognizant of the fact that such a reversal and in-turn mandate for equality 
could place the progress of harmonization of equal pay based on gender at 
risk. 
Lastly, and perhaps the most challenging effort the EU as a whole can 
take to improving the condition of the equal pay doctrine across the 
continent, is to broaden the scope of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) to require an 
inter-member-state requirement that employers must treat their workers 
equally based on gender.  In other words, an employer operating in two or 
more EU member-states must adhere to the equal pay doctrine in each of 
those member-states.  By example, an employer operating in Sweden and 
Germany must compensate equally the female workers in Sweden and the 
male workers in Germany if those workers are engaged in work of 
comparable value.  Such a broadening of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) would 
also mitigate the possibility that an employer would relocate its operations 
to a member-state that takes a more relaxed view of the equal pay doctrine 
legally, historically, and/or culturally.  As well, gains for women associated 
with the equal pay doctrine across the EU, as identified in Section I, could 
be better realized. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As previously stated, one estimate is that full pay equality will not exist 
in the EU until 2058 which represents at least one full generation from the 
time of this Article.  In Richards v. United Kingdom, the ECJ held that it is 
a fundamental human right not to be discriminated based on gender and that 
such a right is embedded in EU law.454  However, despite all of the progress 
made by the ECJ in ensuring member-states and employers within the 
twenty-eight-country EU adhere to the equal pay doctrine, the ECJ’s 
decisions in Cadman, Allonby, Lawrence, and Rinner-Kuhn threaten to 
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dismantle some of the progress by potentially creating twenty-eight 
different standards for equal pay.  The real progress of the ECJ has been in 
developing and broadening the scope of the term “pay” within the 
framework of Article 157 (ex 141, 119) given that the Article is deplete of a 
definition of pay.  The term has been expanded to include virtually all 
forms of remuneration including retirement contributions, in-kind benefits, 
redundancy pay, civil judgments, pay supplements, sick leave benefits, pay 
during maternity leave, pay during military leave, termination payments, 
and service credits. 
The ECJ could provide greater protection against potential unequal pay 
by tightening the discretion espoused in Cadman and Rinner-Kuhn and 
reversing its decisions in Allonby and Lawrence by closing the door left 
open by those decisions which allow an employer to gain the same work at 
a lower wage rate, and possibly from the same workers, through an 
outsourcing and subcontractor arrangement. 
 
